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The excited utterance exception admits hearsay statements made
while the declarant was under the stress or excitement of a particularly
startling event, on the theory that such stress or excitementprecludes the
kind of reflection necessary for the declarant to fabricate, and hence
renders such out-of-court statements sufficiently reliable. The excited
utterance exception has long been subjected to a psychological critique,
which questions the wisdom of a doctrine that relies on the stress of the
declarant. This criticism claims that stress and excitement are as likely
to cloud perception and memoryas they are to ensure truthfulness. The
author applies the insights of both the difference and dominance
schools of feminist jurisprudence to explain the longevity and cultural
appeal of the doctrine in the face of such challenges. She criticizes the
existing excited utterance exception on the ground that it betrays a masculine bias, privileging the accustomed responses to stress of empowered
persons over those of women and other disadvantaged groups. The excited utterance exception ignores the experiences of people who deviate
from the rule's paradigm of how "normal"people react to stress, and
thereby subtly perpetuates a cultural and legal image of women as unreliable. In particular, the Article focuses on the inconsistency between
the doctrinal demands of the excited utterance and women's documented reactions to rape. In requiring a prompt statement and visible
signs of distress, the excited utterance exception simply does not reflect
the reported experiences of many rape survivors who often are too disoriented, numb, afraid, or ashamed to issue a prompt statement, excited
or otherwise. Instead, the excited utterance exception seems to describe
best those who are sufficientlyconfidentof their power to emit a prompt
excited cry, and who expect that their cries will be taken seriously. In
response, the author proposes a modification of the excited utterance
exception, and an additional exception that would allow out-of-court
statements by survivors of sexual violence even when made well after the
attack itself The author incorporates safeguards to protect the rights of
criminal defendants when such statementsare to be introduced.
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INTRODUCTION

Evidencelaw is ideally suitedfor feministanalysis. This area of
law regulates and reflects the construction of courtroom "truth." It
perpetuatesthe culturalvalues, legal rules, and social norms that our society uses to assess credibility.' On a more practical, doctrinal level, evidence law controls who will be heard. Essentially, evidence law governs
how legal stories are presentedand influences which stories are believed.
Feminist method offers a fascinating perspective on evidence law,
because feminism, like evidence, is concernedwith how stories are heard
and how society determines credibility. Feminist method seeks to uncover unconscious assumptions embedded in law and to examine how
purportedly neutral rules may discriminate against women.2 This
method also facilitates examination of the often unarticulated theories
of relevance and reliability underlying evidence law.
This Article uses a feminist method to analyze the excited utterance
doctrine, a codified exception to the hearsay rule in evidence law.3 In
particular,the Article explores how the practical effects of the doctrine
can be devastating for prosecutions of rape and other sexual crimes.
The current limitations of the excited utteranceexception sharply curtail
1.
CAUSE":

See

BARBARA

HISTORICAL

J.

SHAPIRO,

"BEYOND

REASONABLE

PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN

DOUBT"
LAW

AND

OF EVIDENCE

"PROBABLE

2 (1991)

of how we 'know'things
(explainingthatevidencelaw reflects"theculture'sgeneralunderstanding
to be true").
2. As feministmethodsforexamininglaw havedeveloped,scholarshaveincreasingly
focused
feministcritiqueson purportedly
"neutral"
areasof law. Varioustraditional
legal disciplinessuch as
tortsandcivil procedurehavejoinedfamilylaw, rape,and sexualharassment
as topicsof feminist
concern. See, e.g., Leslie Bender,An Overviewof Feminist TortsScholarship,78 CORNELL
L. REV.
575 (1993); JudithResnik, "Naturally"WithoutGender: Women,Jurisdiction,and the Federal Courts,

66 N.Y.U.L. REV.1682(1991)(examiningtherolesof womenin federalcourtandtheroleof gender
in federaljurisdiction);
ElizabethM. Schneider,Gendering and Engendering Process, 61 U. CIN. L
REV.1223,1223n.3, 1224nn.4 & 6, 1231-32(1993) (listingarticlesaboutfeminismand procedure
and notingthat"feministconcernwith processcan assistus to explorea richer, more focused,
complexandcontextualanalysisof theroleof process").
Initialgroundwork
has been laid in applyingfeminismto evidencelaw generally. See Aviva
Orenstein, Feminism & Evidence, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, WOMEN AND THE LAW: CRITICAL
AGENDAAND BIBLIOGRAPHY(Sharon Rush et al. eds., forthcoming 1997)
ESSAYS,RESEARCH

(exploringpossibleconnectionsbetweenfeminismandevidence);Ann Althouse,TheLyingWoman,

the Devious Prostitute,and Other Stories From the Evidence Casebook, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 914

(1994) (reviewingevidencecasebooksfor genderbias);RosemaryC. Hunter,Genderin Evidence:

Masculine Norms vs. FeministReforms,19 HARV.WOMEN'S
L.J. 127 (1996) (analyzing the effects of

genderon questionsof credibilityandrelevance);Kit Kinports,EvidenceEngendered,1991U. ILL.
L. REV.413 (explainingways evidence law mightlearn from feministjurisprudence);Marilyn

MacCrimmon,TheSocial Constructionof Realityand the Rules of Evidence, 25 U.
REV.36 (1991).

BRIT. COLUM.

L

3. Theexcitedutterance
statements
to a startlingevent
exceptionadmitsout-of-court
"relating
or conditionmadewhile the declarantwas underthe stressof excitementcausedby the event or
condition."FED.R. EvID.803(2). Thesestatements
are substantive
evidenceadmittedfor the truth
of the matterassertedby the declarant.Thedeclarant
need nottestify,even thoughshe is available
as a witness. FED.R. EVID.803.
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the chances for survivors of rape or other sexual violence to tell their
stories truthfully, completely, and in their own words. By requiring a
prompt utterance and visible signs of distress, the excited utterance exception fails to reflect the reported experiences of rape survivors, who
often are too disoriented, numb, afraid, or ashamed to issue a prompt
statement,excited or otherwise.
In charting the misfit between the doctrine and the reported experiences of women subjected to rape and other sexual violence, the Article
examines how the excited utterancedoctrine may perpetuatea legal and
cultural image of women as unreliable. To remedy this disjuncture between the excited utterance exception and the experiences of sexual
violence survivors, the Article proposes a new hearsay exception targeted to survivors of sexual violence.
Part I of this Article describes the hearsay rule and its traditional
rationale. Part II traces the doctrinal history of the excited utterance
exception, which admits out-of-court statements concerning a startling
event made while the declarantis still underthe stress of the event. Part
II also summarizes the standard psychological critique of the excited
utteranceexception. This critique postulates that the declarant's stress, a
necessary element of the excited utterance exception, may distort the
declarant's perception and memory, thereby diminishing the declarant's reliability and discrediting the rationale of the excited utterance
doctrine.
The Article next develops and applies a feminist analysis to the excited utterance exception. Part III draws on two strands of feminism,
difference and dominance feminism. Applying theories from these two
schools of feminism, the Article assails the structureand philosophy of
the hearsay rule, concluding that it both reinforces hierarchical relations
in the courtroomand disfavors certain speakers and styles of communication. Specifically, Part III argues that the hearsay ban tends to exclude women's styles of communication, which have traditionally
emphasized informalityand privacy. Despite this criticism, however, the
Article does not advocate eliminating the hearsay rule, because of concern for the rights of criminal defendants, particularlythe right to confront witnesses.
Part IV subjects the excited utterance exception to a feminist critique in the context of survivors of rape and other sexual violence. In
particular,the Article focuses on the disjuncture between the doctrinal
demands of the excited utteranceexception-an excited cry issued near
the time of the startling event-and women's documented reactions to
rape and other sexual violence. This problem is exacerbatedby the fact
that although courts are unpredictable in their determinations of the
timing requirements for admissibility of excited utterances, many will
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often exclude survivors'statementsif they do not fall within narrow
time constraints. The strictadherenceto timing requirementsis particularlytroublingwherethe excited uttereris unavailablebecause she
was killed or intimidatedby her attacker. Even wherethe survivoris
availableto testify, however,the excited utterancerule is problematic,
excluding hearsaystatementsthat may provideincreasedinformation
andcontext,particularly
wherethe survivoris traumatized,
embarrassed,
or is otherwisea reticentwitness.
Part IV argues that the excited utteranceexception stems from
overlynarrowand genderedassumptionsof how "normal" people react to stress. Additionally,the Articleobservesthatthe culturalstereotypes embeddedin the excitedutterancedoctrinereflectthe experience
andworldview of those who possesspower,and who,by extension,are
confidentenoughto emit a promptexcitedcry andexpectit to be taken
seriously. The excited utterancedoctrineexcludescertainreliablebut
less powerfulspeakers,therebycontributingto a legal climatethatdiscredits,amongothers,manywomen.4
To remedythe underinclusivenatureof the excited utteranceexception,PartV proposesa new hearsayexceptionthattargetssurvivors
of sexualviolence.5The proposalwouldapplyto all survivorsof sexual
crimes,notjust women. Becauseof trauma,fear,lack of power,shame,
or even reticent conversationalstyle, such survivorsmay not make
prompt statementsor exhibit external,culturallyrecognized signs of
stress. For this reason,the proposalwould admit extra-judicialstatementsmade by survivorsinto evidencewithoutregardto the length of
delay betweenthe traumaticevent and the survivor'sstatement. Additionally,the proposaleliminatesthe requirementthatthe speakermanifest or experiencestresswhenmakingthe utterance.

4. This theory extends to other disempoweredgroupsand thereforecalls for further
andexploration
of this effect. See infraPartIV.E (callingfor extensionof the excited
scholarship
utterancedoctrine).
5. ThisArticleuses the term"survivor"
ratherthan"victim"to refer to someonewho has
sexualviolence. Thischoicereflectsanattemptto avoidthestigmaof victimization
and
experienced
to honorthepeoplewhosurvivethe ordealof rape. See MarthaR. Mahoney,Exit:Powerand the
Idea of Leaving in Love, Work,and the ConfirmationHearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1310-11 &

has replaced"victim"in feministvocabularyto refutethe
n.115(1992)(explainingthat"survivor"
notionthatthewomanin rapeandbattering
situationsis passive);EvelynMaryAswad,Note, Torture
by Means of Rape, 84 GEo.L.J. 1913, 1916 n.l11(1996) (explainingthe use of the term rape
to "eliminate
thevictimrole")(quotingMetinBasoglu,Preventionof Tortureand Care of
"survivor"
Survivors,270 JAMA606, 606 (1993)). Thisterminology
is not withoutits critics,who believe that
avoidanceof theterm"victim"is unfairandmayin somewayblamewomenorignorethe feeling of
being a victim. See, e.g., Kate E. Bloch, A Rape Law Pedagogy, 7 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM
307, 308

n.6 (1995) (using "the term rape 'survivor'reluctantly"
because of respect for the feelings of
victimization
of peoplewho have been raped). Unfortunately,
thisterminology
becomesawkward
whenthe rape"survivor"
literallydoesnot surviveanddies of herrape-related
injuries.
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The proposedexception also reflects a concern for the rights of
criminaldefendants.It requires,wherepossible,thatdefendantsbe presentedwith an opportunityto cross examinedeclarantsof excited utterances or survivors'statements.Wherethe declarantis unavailable,the
proposal requiresa particularizedshowingof trustworthiness.These
and othersafeguardsguaranteethat the interestsof criminaldefendants
will not be sacrificedin fashioninga hearsayexception that acknowledges and includesthe experienceof womenandothersurvivorsof sexrelatedcrimes.
I
THE TRADITIONALDEFINITION AND DEFENSE OF THE
HEARSAY RULE

The hearsayrule providesthatout-of-courtstatementsmay not be
used for the truthof the matterasserted.6A party cannot introducea
statementmade outside the trial to persuadethe trier of fact that the
statementis substantivelytrue.7
The most prevalentmodern theory explaining the hearsay rule
holds that the rules of evidence in general,and hearsayin particular,
track the developmentof the jury system. Over time, the jury has
shifted from a group of neighbors with personal knowledge of the
eventsat issue to an impartialfact-findinggroup that relies on partygeneratedevidence.8 A combinationof paternalismand distrustof jurors promptedcourtsto exclude from the jury's considerationcategories of evidencedeemedunreliable.'The most importantexclusion was
6. See Ohiov. Roberts,448 U.S. 56, 62 n.4 (1980) (relyingon McCormick'sdefinitionof
in court,or writtenevidence,of a statementmadeout of court,the statement
hearsayas "testimony
beingoffered as an assertionto showthe truthof mattersassertedtherein,andthusrestingfor its
valueuponthe credibilityof theout-of-court
asserter").
7. Thehearsayrulepresentsmanypuzzles. Thefirst,andarguablyhardest,intellectualstepis
to identifyhearsay.Forinstance,courtsand scholarshave ponderedthe natureof an out-of-court
"statement"
andwhetherassertionsmustbe intentional.See,e.g., RogerC. Park,"IDidn'tTellThem
AnythingAbout You":ImpliedAssertionsas Hearsay Underthe Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN.

L. REV.783 (1990) (examiningtreatmentof impliedassertionsunder modem caselaw); Glen
Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal Evidence Rule 803(3), 64 TEMP.L. REV. 145
ON EVIDENCE
(1991); see also MCCORMICK
?? 244, 246 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992)
[hereinafterMcCORMICK].

8.

See MCCORMICK,
betweenthe development
supranote7, ? 244 (discussingtherelationship

of the jury and hearsay law); JAMESBRADLEY
TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE
THAYER,A PRELIMINARY
ATTHECOMMON
LAW519 (1898). See generally John Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witnessto
Judge of Proofs: The Transformationof the English Civil Juror, 32 AM. J. LEGALHIST.201, 203-12

(1988).
9.

See Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 IOWAL. REV. 227, 293 (1988)

(disagreeingwiththe "long-prevailing
jurydistrustmodelof evidencelaw");id. at 229-30; Roger
Park, A Subject Matter Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 MICH.L. REV. 51, 60 n.37 (1987)

("[B]ecauseof distrustof juries-a beliefthatjurorslackthecompetenceto makeallowancefor the
second-handcharacterof hearsay-such evidence,althoughacceptedby administrative
agencies,
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hearsay. Courts consider jurors too unsophisticatedand gullible to
weigh hearsayappropriately.'
Whatis it about hearsaythatcan triggera juror's irrationalityor
poor judgment? Traditionally,evidencelaw excludedhearsaybecause
it lacked the following characteristics:
assurancesof reliabilitysteman
from
in-court
the
oath,"
ming
ability of the factfinderto observe
witnessdemeanor,12the possibilityof prosecutionof the declarantfor
perjury,and, most importantly,the opportunityfor cross-examination.'3
For instance,imaginethatan in-courtwitnesswantsto testify that
an absent declarant,Dora, exclaimed near the scene of an accident,
"The car ran the red light!" The hearsayrule requiresDora's direct
testimony,ratherthana reportfrom anotherwitnessabout whatDora
said. Even if the witnessto Dora's declarationweretruthfulin his rejuvenilecourtsandlegislativecommittees,is (subjectto be sure,to numerousexceptions)barredin
jury trials.")(quoting J. FRANK,COURTSON TRIAL123 (1949)); L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness
Testimony:Back to the Future, 29 U. RICH.L. REV. 1389, 1425 n.210 (1995) (citing Jones on

Evidence and THAYER,
supranote 8 for the jury mistrusttheory of hearsay);Eleanor Swift,
Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 CALIF.L. REV.495, 496 n.2 (1987) (noting that "most commentators

see the hearsayrule as a child of the jury, a tool for judicial protectionagainst inaccurate
factfinding").
10. A secondtheory,the "bestevidenceprinciple,"has been recentlyrevived by Professor
Dale Nance. See Nance, supranote 9 (arguingthatthe overarchingprincipleof evidencelaw is
securingthe best reasonablyobtainedevidence);see also EdwardJ. Imwinkelried,The Worst
Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesisas to the Logical Structureof EvidenceLaw, 46 U. MIAMIL.

REV.1069 (1992) (rejectingthe jury-focusedapproachand arguingthatevidence law revolves
around avoiding untrustworthy
evidence and witnesses-the worst evidence-rather than
seekingthe bestevidence).
affirmatively
11. Thereis debateabouttheefficacyof theoathin an agethathas rejecteddivineretribution.
becauseout-of-court
even when sworn,
Wigmorearguedthatthe oathwas non-essential,
statements,
were not admissible for their hearsaypurpose. See 5 JOHNHENRYWIGMORE,
IN TRIALS
EVIDENCE
ATTHECOMMON
LAW? 1362(JamesH. Chadbourn
ed., 1978). McCormick
arguespersuasively,

however,thatthe oathhas some vestigialimpactby addingto the solemnityand majestyof the
proceedings. See McCORMICK,
supra note 7, ? 245.

12. Evidencelaw encouragesin-courttestimonyanddisfavorsout-of-courtstatements.See

Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELLL. REV. 1075, 1076 (1991) (noting the law's

preferencefor demeanorevidence, but questioningits effectivenessin determiningwhether a
witnessis lying).
13. See,e.g., Donnellyv. UnitedStates,228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913) (explainingthathearsayis
generally unreliablebecause it lacks protectionsof oath, demeanorobservation,and crossexamination). Lest this be the only evidence law review article in historyto discuss crossexaminationwithouttrottingout Wigmore'sfamousdictum,here it is: Wigmoredescribedcrossexamination
as "beyondanydoubtthegreatestlegalengineeverinventedforthediscoveryof truth."
WIGMORE,
supra note 11, ? 1367, at 32.

Thereare manyotherexplanations
for andreformulations
of the hearsayrule aside fromthe
traditional
frettingover accuracyandconcernfor cross-examination.The hearsayrule mustbe
at least in part,as an outgrowthof the adversarysystem. Forall the concernsabout
understood,
accuracy,reliability,andjuryconfusion,hearsayis almostentirelypartydriven. Generally,if the

parties fail to object, the hearsayis in. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 7, ? 245.

In addition,the hearsayrule can be seen as a mechanismfor preventingthe governmentand
frommanufacturing
reamsof documents
to delugeopponentswho lack resources.
largecorporations
See Park,supranote9, at 65-66.
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port,"4information could get lost in the translationor repetition. Dora
could have been joking or lying. Something could have obstructed her
view. She could be colorblind. Too much time might have elapsed
since the car passed for Dora to remember. The witness could have
misheard Dora. These concerns regarding sincerity, narration,perception, and memory form the core of the traditional preference for incourt testimony.
Although these "hearsay dangers" are also present in live testimony, they are diminished by the availability of cross-examination.
Cross-examination is designed to uncover weaknesses in Dora's account. These weakness might be impossible to detect without Dora herself, ratherthan a reportinghearsay witness, on the stand.15
Of course, one cannot comprehend the scope of hearsay without
inquiry into its many exceptions.16 What characteristicsmake evidence
admitted pursuant to these exceptions preferable to requiring live, incourt testimony or to excluding the evidence altogether? Although
there are various justifications for the different exceptions,"17many hearsay exceptions are chiefly explained by the presumed trustworthinessof
the statements they admit. The law of evidence has established categories of statementsfor which the traditionalconcern with sincerity is offset by some presumed guarantee of reliability. For instance, courts
justify the declaration-against-interestexception because of its purported reliability.'8 The declaration-against-interestexception admits
out-of-court statements that are contrary to the speaker's pecuniary interest for the truthof the matterasserted. This exception arose from the
14. This factor can be tested insofar as it is possible to detect lies and liars on crossexamination,because the reportingwitness does testify in court.
15. See MCCORMICK,supra note 7, ? 245 (discussing reasons for the rule against hearsay);
LaurenceH. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARV.L. REv. 957, 958 (1974).
16. The exceptions are so vast, they arguably swallow the rule, as Professor James Bradley
Thayer wrote:
But then comes the question, what is the rule, and what are the exceptions? There lies a
difficulty. A true analysis would probably restate the law so as to make what we call the
hearsay rule the exception, and make our main rule this, namely, that whatsoever is
relevant is admissible.
THAYER, supra note 8, at 522. Similarly,a more modern commentatorhas observed, "In the sea of
admitted hearsay, the rule excluding hearsay is a small and lonely island." Jack B. Weinstein,
Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 IOWAL. REv. 331, 346 (1961); see I. Daniel Stewart,Jr., Perception,
Memory,and Hearsay: A Criticismof Present Law and the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970
UTAH L.
REv. 1, 7 (noting that "numerousexceptions largely subsume the general rule").
17. Justifications for exceptions include necessity, see, e.g., FED. R. EvID 801(d)(2)(E)
(excepting from the hearsay rule co-conspirators'statementsmade during and in furtherance of the
conspiracy), and the adversary system, see FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(A) (excepting personal
admissions from the hearsayrule). Certainly,no coherentunifying theory explains the "crazy quilt"
of hearsay exceptions.
18. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). This hearsay exception can only be used if the declarant is
unavailableto testify. Although I discuss declarationscontraryto pecuniaryinterest, the exception is
not limited to such interests.
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presumptionthatpeoplerarelymakestatementscontraryto their financial interest;therefore,such statementsareparticularly
trustworthy.
the
of
an
excited
utterance
is justified by
Similarly, admissibility
the purportedtrustworthiness
of such statements.The excited utterance
exceptionrelies on the theory thatthe nervousexcitementexperienced
by the uttererleads to spontaneity,whichin turnguaranteesreliability.
However,as the PartII.C demonstrates,many psychologistsas well as
legal scholarspoint to persuasiveevidencethat reliabilitydoes not invariablyfollow from spontaneity,and thatnervousexcitementcan lead
to confusionand failureof perception.
II
THE EXCITED UTTERANCE EXCEPTION: NERVOUS AGITATION AS A
GUARANTY OF SPONTANEITY, SINCERITY, AND RELIABILITY

A. A History of the Doctrine

The excitedutteranceexceptionderivesfrom res gestae, whichliterally means "things done" or "things happened."'9Many modern
evidenceconceptshave evolved from the concept of res gestae. According to McCormick,courtsbegan to employ the term in the early
1800s to include spontaneousdeclarationsthat accompaniedlegally
relevantacts.20Res gestae includeselementsthatfall outsidethe modern
evidenceof stateof
hearsaydefinitionaltogether,suchas circumstantial
so-called
"verbal
mind,
acts," verbalpartsof acts, and certain nonverbalconduct. Becauseexcited utterancesare connected closely in
time to the eventandthe excitementflows fromthe event,excited utterances weredeemed partof the action(the "things done") and hence
19. Theconceptrefersto "wordsspoken,thoughtsexpressed,andgesturesmade..,.so closely
connectedto occurrenceor event in bothtimeand substanceas to be a part of the happening."

BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY
1305 (6th ed. 1990). Res gestae are the "automatic and undesigned
incidents of the particularact in issue ... ." Keefe v. State, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937). Although
courts still occasionally employ the term res gestae, it is for the most part a relic that served as a

transitional
devicein theevolutionof varioushearsayexceptions.See McCORMICK,
supranote 7, ?
268.
Res gestae capturedthe interestand inspiredthe ire of manyevidencegreats. Sir Frederick
Pollackcalled it a "damnablepretendeddoctrine." Letterfrom Sir FrederickPollockto Oliver

Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Apr. 23, 1931), in 2 HOLMES-POLLOCK
LETTERS
284 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., 2d ed. 1941). Edmund M. Morgan began his classic article, A Suggested Classificationof
Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALELJ. 229 (1922), by noting that "[t]he marvelous

for reasoning... [is] nowherebetterillustrated
capacityof a Latinphraseto serve as a substitute
thanin thedecisionsdealingwiththeadmissibility
of evidenceas 'resgestae."' Id. at 229. Learned

Hand remarked, ".. . as for 'res gestae,' it is a phrase which has been accountable for so much
confusion that it had best be denied any place whateverin legal terminology;if it means anything but
an unwillingness to think at all, what it covers cannotbe put in less intelligible terms." United States v.
Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir. 1944).
20. See MCCORMICK,
supra note 7, ? 268. These statementsfall outside the hearsay definition
because they do not demandthat the factfinderbelieve that the statements are actually true, but only
that they were made. See FED. R. EVID.801(c) advisory committee's note.
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admissibledespitethe hearsayrule. Res gestae also sired the hearsay
exceptionsfor present-senseimpressions,excited utterances,direct evidence of stateof mind,andstatementsmadeto physicians.21
The excitedutteranceexceptionprovidesthatstatementsmade under the influenceof an excitingeventwhile the speakeris still in a state
of nervousexcitementmay be admittedfor the truthof the mattersthey
assert. This exception wasisolatedand promotedby John HenryWigmore.22In his multi-volumetreatiseon evidence,Wigmoredevelopedin
intricatedetail whathe termedthe "spontaneousexclamation"exception to hearsay,whichwe recognizetoday as the excited utteranceexception. According to Wigmore,a hearsaystatementmust meet the
following criteriato qualify underthis exception:(1) there must be a
"startlingoccasion," (2) the out-of-courtstatementmustbe made before the declaranthas had time to "fabricate,"and (3) the declarant's
out-of-courtstatementmustrelateto the circumstancesof the startling
event.23
Wigmoreexplainedthe policy of the exceptionas follows:
This general principleis based on the experience that, under
certain external circumstancesof physical shock, a stress of
nervousexcitementmay be producedwhich stills the reflective
facultiesand removestheircontrol,so that the utterancewhich
then occurs is a spontaneousand sincereresponseto the actual
sensationsand perceptionsalready produced by the external
shock.24

21. See EleanorSwift,TheHearsayRuleat Work:Has it BeenAbolishedDe Factoby Judicial
L. REV.473, 475 (1992).
Decision?,76 MINN.
22.

See 4 JACK B. WEINSTEIN& MARGARET
A. BERGER,WEINSTEIN'SEVIDENCE

I 803(2)[01][D],at 803-85(discussingexcitedutteranceexceptionandnotingthatit was "deducted

JamesDonaldMoorehead,
the HearsayRule: TheFallacyof
initiallyby Wigmore");
Compromising
ResGestaeReliability,
29 LoY.L.A.L. REV.203, 232 (1995) ("Theexceptionfor excitedutterance
maybe traceddirectlyto Wigmore'sbelief' thatstressleads to sincerity.);Park,supranote 9, at 76
n.100 (1987) (discussinghow the doctrineof res gestaeevolved "withWigmore'shelp" into the
excitedutteranceexception).
23.

6 WIGMORE,
supra note 11, ? 1750, at 202. The modernrule tracks all three requirements.

See Fed.R. Evid.803(2);infranotes41-43andaccompanying
text.
24. 6 WIGMORE,
supranote 11, ? 1747, at 195. In anothersection, Wigmoresimilarly
explainedthat"inthe stressof nervousexcitementthe reflectivefacultiesmay be stilledand the
utterancemay become the unreflectingand sincere expressionof one's actualimpressionsand
belief." Id. ? 1749,at 199. Moremodemscholarshiphas echoedthis reasoning,notingthat the
and his memoryis fresh
excitingevent "leavesthe speakermomentarily
incapableof fabrication,
becausetheimpression
hasnotyetpassedfromhis mind."CHRISTOPHER
B. MUELLER
& LAIRD
C.
KIRKPATRICK,EVIDENCE ? 8.35, at 1217(1995) (notingthat "[i]n short,risks of insincerityand
see also GLENWEISSENBERGER,
FEDERAL
EVIDENCE
memorylapseareremoved");
? 803.7,at 440
madein reactionto a startlingstimulusare consideredmoretrustworthy
(2d ed. 1995)("Statements
thanhearsaygenerallyon thedualgroundsthat,first,thestimulusrendersthe declarantincapableof
fabrication
on thedeclarant's
and,second,theimpression
memoryat thetime of the statementis still
freshandintense.").
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The witness' stateof nervoustensionwas of utmostimportancein
Wigmore'sanalysis. Accordingto Wigmore,this "immediateand uncontrolled dominationof the senses" lasts for a "brief period."25
During this short time, neitherthoughtsof "self-interest" nor other
"reasonedreflection"arise.26Therefore,the utteranceis "particularly
and may be admitteddespiteits hearsaycharacter.27Wigtrustworthy"
more even hintedthat such evidence is superiorto in-courttestimony
becauseof its spontaneityandclosenessto the event.28
Wigmoretracedthe excitedutterancedoctrinebackto Thompsonv.
Trevanion, decided by Lord Holt in 1693.29 In Thompson, the court
permittedthe out-of-courtdeclarationof the wife of the plaintiff (she
could not sue on her own behalf) "immediately[sic] upon the Hurtreceived, andbeforethatshe hadTimeto devise or contriveany Thingfor
25. 6 WIGMORE,
to speculatehow Wigmore,
supranote 11, ? 1747,at 195. It is interesting
whose intellectualmaturitycoincidedwiththe arrivalof psychoanalytic
theoryin America,might
have been influencedby the growthof Freudianpsychology. The psychoanalyticinsightthat
emotionssometimesaffectmentalfunction,intellect,andperceptionsupportsWigmore'stheorythat
stressstillsreflection.
26.

Id.

27. Id. Similarly,in 1929 EdmundMorgandescribeda hearsay exception relating to
utterance.See generallyMorgan,supranote 19. Such an utteranceconcerns"a
"spontaneous"
startlingevent"made"bya declarant
laboringundersucha stressof nervousexcitement,causedby
thatevent,as to makesuch utterancespontaneous
and unreflective."Id. at 238. Thisspontaneous
utterance
wasadmissiblein manycourtsdespiteits hearsaystatus.See id. Accordingto Morgan,the
waslikelyto be trustworthy
because"thementalconditionof the declarantis such that
declaration
theprobability
of his beingableto devisea falsehoodis veryremote."Id. at 239.
28. 6 WIGMORE,
of the
supranote11, ? 1749,at 199(discussing"thesuperiortrustworthiness"
out-of-courtstatementsas "creatinga necessityor at leasta desirabilityof resortingto them for
unbiasedtestimony").See generallyW.A. Harrington,
Annotation,Time Elementas Affecting

Admissibilityof Statementor ComplaintMade by Victimof Sex Crime as Res Gestae, Spontaneous

Exclamation,or Excited Utterance,89 A.L.R.3d102 (1979) (Supp. 1996) (organizingexcited
utterancecases by lapse of time). Furthermore,
Wigmorearguedthatthe exceptionrequiredno
neitherdeathnor otherreasonsfor absenceof the witness
principleof necessityto be admissible;
need be shownto admitthe spontaneous
exclamation.See 6 WIGMORE,
supranote 11, ? 1748.
thatbystander
declarations
shouldbe admissible
so longas the bystanderwas
Wigmorewas adamant
underthe stressof nervousexcitement.See id. ? 1750, at 202-03. Moreover,he believedthat
andinfancydidnotdisqualifya declarant.See id. ? 1751;see also McCORMICK,
insanity,criminality,
supranote7, ? 272, at 476 ("Thedeclarantneed not actuallybe involvedin the event;an excited
utteranceby a bystanderis admissible.");
Quick,supranote 22, at 213 (discussingthe issue of
competenceandexcitedutterance).Wigmoreobservedthattheprimaryobjectionto thetestimonyof
children-thatthey wouldnotunderstand
the solemnityof the oath--didnot applyin the excited
utterancesettingwherenoneof thedeclarations
were madeunderoathanyway. See 6 WIGMORE,
supranote11, ? 1751,at223.
29. See id. ? 1747,at 196(citingSkinner402 (1693)). Hereis theopinionin full:
RuleduponEvidence,thata Mayhemmaybe given in Evidence,in an Actionof Trespass
of Assault,Battery,andWounding,
as anEvidenceof WoundingperHoltChiefJustice;and
in thisCasehe alsoallowed,thatwhattheWifesaidimmediate
upontheHurtreceived,and
beforethatshe hadTimeto deviseor contriveanyThingforher own Advantage,mightbe
givenin Evidence;Quodnota;thiswasatNisipriusin Middlesexforwoundingof the Wife
of thePlaintiff.
Skinner402 (1693).
Thompsonv. Trevanion,
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her own Advantage. . . ."o Interestingly,the case that,accordingto
Wigmore,establishedthe excited utteranceis ambiguous. It is unclear
fromthe very brieftext whetherthe declarationwas reliablebecausethe
wife was excitedor becausehercry was immediate,or perhapsboth.
was not reWigmorepostulatedthatprecisecontemporaneousness
the
to
meet
excited
utterance
and
believed
that the
quired
exception
doctrinedid not have a fixed time limitbetweenstartlingevent and excited utterance. He disdained the timing issue and decried the
"lamentablewaste of time" expendedby variousstatehigh courtstrying to pin downprecisetemporallimitsfor the doctrine'sapplication.3"
He believedthatdurationof stress,ratherthan exact timing,played the
predominantrolejustifyingthis exceptionto the hearsayrule.32
For this reason, Wigmorederided a famous, early, and contentiously debated33Englishcase, Regina v. Bedingfield,3 for adheringto
30. Id. (emphasisadded).
31. 6 WIGMORE,
supra note 11, ? 1750,at 221. Wigmorecontendedthatall suchjudgments
werecontextualandto tryto establisha generalruleon thetimelimit"isto triflewithprincipleandto
cumberthe recordswithunnecessary
andunprofitable
quibbles."Id. Ironically,the timingquestion,
andall thequibblingit entails,represents
a controversial
partof the doctrinetodayandserves as the
basis of many (unsuccessful)appeals of criminalconvictions. See infra notes 58-61 and
text.
accompanying
32. Thereis a strongargumentthatin "restating"
the commonlaw, Wigmoreoverstatedthe
entrenchment
of the excitedutterancedoctrinewithinthe commonlaw. Wigmoreadvocatedthe
excited utteranceas the truedescendantof the res gestae conceptand rejectedthe presentsense
impression(which requiresalmostcontemporaneous
utterance,but does not require a stressful
event). See 6 WIGMORE,
supra note 11, ? 1750; see also Moorehead, supra note 22, at 230 ("In

contrastwithhis supportof the excitedutteranceexception,Wigmoreopposedthe exceptionfor
presentsense impression. . . ."). In justifyingthe admissionof these startlingstatements,Wigmore
the traditional
emphasizedthe confusioncausedby the startlingevent,butundervalued
requirement
of closenessin time. He failedto appreciatethatthe continuousagitationof mindwas not in itself
considereda guaranteeof trustworthiness,
but ratherthe stress was a proxy for a
traditionally
briefnessin time. Thisconfusionis reflectedin his interpretation
of Thompson
v. Trevanion,
in which
Wigmorestressedtheexcitementbutignoredtherelatedtimingquestion;thatthe statementwas said
"immediate
uponthe Hurtreceived."See 6 WIGMORE,
supranote11,?? 1747,1749.
of the
Additionally,
Wigmore'sscholarshipis subjectto criticismfor his mischaracterization
SupremeCourt's decision in Travellers'InsuranceCo. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397 (1869). The

Courtin Travellers'emphasizedthe connectionin timeand place betweenthe utteranceand the
centralfactin the case, ratherthanthe excitingqualityof the event. See id. at 408; 6 WIGMORE,
in hiscommenton Vicksburg& Meridian
supranote11, ? 1747. Wigmorewassimilarlyunforthright
Railroadv. O'Brien,119U.S.99 (1886),wherehe quotedwithapprovalfromJusticeField'sdissent,
butmadeno mentionof the majorityopinion
stressingtheexcitednatureof theout-of-court
statement,
thatFieldwrotein dissent).See6 WIGMORE
(andgaveno indication
supranote 11, ? 1749. Also in
his Vicksburgdiscussion,Wigmore,in advocatingthe excited utteranceexception,redactedthe
SupremeCourtopinionto edit out favorableremarksaboutGreenleaf,anothertreatisewriterwith
whomWigmoredisagreed.See id.
33. Forthosewho thinkthatbackbitingscholarlycommentary
and mediahype of sensational

trials are a modem phenomenon, Thayer's three-part article on the Bedingfield case will quickly
disabuse them of their misplaced nostalgia. The Chief Judge of England responded with acrimony
when his opinion in Bedingfield was criticized in the London Times. The Chief Judge issued
pamphlets and newspaper editorials mocking Greenleaf and Taylor, two evidence luminaries who
had publicly criticized the opinion. Taylor respondedin kind, arguing that the Chief Justice's attack
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a rigidrule of contemporaneousness.In Bedingfield,an English Court
excludedan utterancemadeonly momentsaftera startlingattack.35The
prosecutorwishedto tell the jury in his opening statementthatthe victim had said before dying, "O aunt,see whatBedingfieldhas done to
me."36 Accordingto the court,her cry did not qualifyas res gestae because "it was somethingstatedby her after it was all over .. .."37 Lord
Cockburndrewthe distinctionbetweena statement"utteredby the deceased at the time the act was being done" and a statementuttered
"afterthe act was completed."38
LordCockburnexplainedthathad the
victimcried,"Don't, Harry!"while the violence transpired,her statementwouldhavebeen admissible.39
Wigmorecriticizedthe Bedingfield
court'sstrictadherenceto timing,arguingthatit led to troubling,even
absurd,results.40 Instead,Wigmoreemphasizedthe startlingnatureof
was "neither
consistentwithyourdignity,yourgenerosity,nor yourjustice.... " JamesB. Thayer,
Bedingfleld's Case: Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta (Pt. I), 14 AM. L. REv. 817, 823-24

(1880) [hereinafter
Thayer,BedingfieldI]. Thayerhimselfwas notabovean acerbicremark,noting
of thephraseres gestae,"Wefindit firstin themouthsof GarrowandLordKenyon,-two famously
ignorantmen." James B. Thayer,Bedingfield's Case, Declarations as a Part of the Res Gesta (Pt. II),
15 AM.L. REv. 1, 10n.1 (1881).

34. 14CoxCrim.Cas.341 (1879).
35. HenryBedingfieldwas chargedwithkillinghis lover who, accordingto the court,had
"refus[ed]himsomethinghe very muchdesired"and appearedto "wishto put an end to these
relations."
See id. at 341. Bedingfieldhad madepriorthreatsto slitthe victim'sthroatand she had
askedforpoliceprotection.
See id. at 341-42. Aftervisitinga "spiritshop,"Bedingfieldwent to her
house(whichwasalso herplaceof business).Id. at 342. Aftera "minuteortwothe [woman]came
withherthroatcut,andon meetingone of themshe
suddenlyoutof thehousetowards[herassistants]
said something,pointingbackwardsto the house. In a few minutesshe was dead." Id. The
defendantwas foundwithhis throatcut as well, buthe recoveredandwaschargedwith murder.He
pled not guilty,arguingthatthe womanattackedhimandthentookher own life. See id. at 344.
Evidenceof the knife in the defendant'sbloodygrasp,the deep cut in her throatinconsistent
with
suicide,andthefact(notcontent)of thevictim'scomplaint,
however,led to theguiltyverdict.See id.
at 344-45. It is also remarkablehow closely the facts of the Bedingfieldcase fit the tragically
familiarpatternof a batteredwomankilledby herlover:anabusivemate,alcohol,failureto receive
anddeathat thehandsof the abuserwhenthewomantriesto leave.
policeprotection,
36.

See Thayer,BedingfieldI, supra note 33, at 826.

37. Bedingfield,14 Cox Crim.Cas. at 342-43. AlthoughBedingfieldwas found guiltyand
sentencedto deathby hanging,a seriousoutcryin the pressandamongscholarsarose out of Lord
Cockburn'sexclusionof the woman'sremarkas fallingoutsidethe res gestae exception. See
Thayer,BedingfieldI, supranote 33, at 819-20. Lord Chief JusticeCockburnalso held that the
deceased's statementdid not qualify as a dying declaration,because there was no evidence that the
victim knew she was dying. See Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim. Cas. at 343-44. Cf FED. R. EvID.

804(b)(2) (providingexceptionto the hearsayrule for statements"madeby a declarantwhile
deathwasimminent,concerning
thecauseor circumstances
believingthatthe declarant's
of whatthe
declarantbelievedto be impendingdeath").
38.
39.
40.

Bedingfield, 14 Cox Crim.Cas. at 342-43.
Id. at 342.
See 6 WIGMORE,
supra note 11, ? 1756 (criticizing Bedingfield as "plainly erroneous").

Interestingly,
earlycasesoftenfit this patternof a victimwho namedhis attackerminutesafterthe
grisly attack,just before dying of his wounds. See, e.g., Rex v. Foster, 6 Car. & P. 325 (1834); Little
Rock, M.R. & T. Ry. Co. v. Leverett,3 S.W. 50 (Ark. 1887).
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the event and claimed that the excitement itself insured credibility.4'
of any contemporaneousness
Wigmore'sinsistenceon the abandonment
the
current
fashioned
doctrine.
requirement
B. The CurrentDoctrine

Underthe modem excited utteranceexception as codified in the
FederalRules of Evidence42(and adoptedby over thirty states),43the
hearsayruledoes not exclude a statementby an out-of-courtdeclarant
"relatingto a startlingevent or conditionmade whilethe declarantwas
underthe stressof excitementcausedby the eventor condition."" In
describingthe utility of this exception,modem commentatorsecho the
historicalrationale.As WeinsteinandBergerexplain,"The assumption
underlyingthis exceptionis thata personunderthe sway of excitement
precipitatedby an externalstartlingevent will not have the reflective
capacityessentialfor fabricationand that,consequently,any utterance
will be spontaneousand trustworthy."45
Underthe FederalRulesof Evidence,the excited utteranceexception appliesregardlessof the declarant'savailabilityto testify at trial.46
Therefore,the declarantneed not testify,even if he or she is available.47
41. See 6 WIGMORE,
supra note 11, ? 1747, at 195.
42. Unlike other federal procedural rules (civil procedure, appellate procedure, criminal
procedure,and bankruptcy)the federal rules of evidence are statutorily passed by Congress and not
promulgatedvia the Rules Enabling Act. See Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal
Rules of EvidenceAfter Sixteen Years-The Effectof "PlainMeaning"Jurisprudence,the Needfor an
Advisory Committeeon the Rules of Evidence,and Suggestionsfor Selective Revision of the Rules, 60
GEO.WASH.L. REV.857, 893-94 (1992).
43.

See GREGORYP. JOSEPH & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE

STATESiii (Supp. 1994).
44. FED. R. EvID. 803(2). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide separate exceptions for
spontaneous utterances distinguishingbetween contemporaneityand stress. Rule 803(1) preserves
the present-sense impressionexception for statementsimmediately contemporaneouswith an event.
See FED. R. EvDo. 803(1). Rule 803(2) retains the excited utterance; it requires no precise
coalescence of exclamation and event, but does requirethe declarantto experience and speak under
the influence of the stress of the startlingevent. See FED.R. EVID.803(2).
45. WEINSTEIN
& BURGER,
supra note 22, ? 803(2)[01].
46. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 sets forth exceptions to the hearsay rule, including the
excited utteranceexception, for which availabilityof the declarantis immaterial. See FED. R. EvID.
803. Rule 803 includes those hearsaystatementsthat have been consideredeither so trustworthyas to
be admissible without requiring impositionof the time and expense associated with productionof a
declarant if available, or of a type where cross-examination of the declarant would provide no
additionalinformationto the fact finder.
47. An excited utterance is "not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
available as a witness." FED. R. EVID.803. FederalRule of Evidence 804(b) sets forthexceptions to
the hearsay rule for which the declarant's inability as a witness is required. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)
(excluding from the hearsay ban statements made by a declarant who is unavailable to testify,
including former testimony, statement under belief of impending death, statement against interest,
etc.). For the purposes of these hearsay exceptions, unavailabilityof a witness is defined in Rule
804(a). "Unavailabilityof a witness" includes situationsin which the declarant is exempted from
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The excitementof the event,whichjustifiesits reliability,also "serves to
thatthe declarantbe unavailable
justify dispensingwith any requirement
becauseit suggeststhattestimonyon the stand,given at a time when the
powersof reflectionandfabricationare operative,is no more (and perIn fact, the idenhapsless) reliablethanthe out-of-courtstatement.""48
of
the
excited
utterer
need
not
be
known, although courts and
tity
commentators
advocatecautionin cases involvingunidentifiedbystand-

ers.49

excited utterAccordingto manytreatisewriters,the contemporary
ance exception is "well established,""5
"time-honored,"5'and "abunfederal
The SupremeCourt's
cases."52
dantly supportedby pre-Rules
Sixth Amendmentjurisprudenceprovidesfurtherindicationof the entrenchmentof the excitedutteranceexception. The SupremeCourthas
twice reaffirmedits faith in the excited utteranceexception as historically tested anddoctrinallysound."
testifying by ruling of the court,refuses to testify to the statementdespite a court order, testifies to a
lack of memory regardingthe statement,or is unableto appearin court. See FED. R. EvID. 804(a).
48. MCCORMICK,
supra note 7, ? 272.
49. See, e.g., Shinnerv. K-MartCorp., 847 F. Supp. 31 (D. Del. 1994) (involving unidentified
person who came to assist plaintiff who slipped on wet floor); Watson v. State, No. 94-1040, 1995
Ark. App. LEXIS (Ark. Ct. App. 1995) ("While statements made by an unidentified bystanderdeclarant may be subjected to special scrutiny, they may still fall within the excited utterance
exception to the hearsayrule.");Coleman v. Spah, C5-92-713, 1992 Minn. App. LEXIS 1114 (1992)
(quoting the advisory committee note "When declarant is an unidentified bystander, the cases
indicate hesitancy in upholdingthe statementalone as sufficient [to establish the statement was made
under aura of excitement]"); WEINSTEIN
& BURGER,
supra note 22; CHARLESALAN WRIGHT&
KENNETH
W. GRAHAM,
PRACTICE
ANDPROCEDURE
JR., FEDERAL
? 6753, at 574-75 (1978).
50. MCCORMICK,
supra note 7, ? 272, at 476 (conceding that "the entire basis" of the excited
utteranceis "subjectto question"but labeling it "well established").
51. WEISSENBERGER,
supra note 24, ? 803.7, at 440 (describing the exception as "timehonored").
52. WEINSTEIN
& BURGER,
supra note 22 (footnote omitted).
53. In Whitev. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992), the Courtheld that an excited utterance made to a
doctor by a four-year-oldgirl was sufficiently reliable to overcome confrontationconcerns because
such an utterancewas a "firmly rooted"hearsayexception. Chief Justice Rehnquist,writing for the
majority, cited only Wigmore's treatise and the old case of Thompsonv. Trevanion, Skinner 402
(1693), as proof that the exception was firmly rooted. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
The Court concluded that hearsay that falls under the excited utterance "is so trustworthythat
adversarialtesting can be expected to add little to its reliability." White,502 U.S. at 357.
In Idaho v. Wright,497 U.S. 805 (1990), the Courtrejectedthe admission of a two and a halfyear-old child's statement concerning her sexual molestation. The statement had been admitted
under the residual or catch-all hearsayexception, which the Courtdecided was not firmly rooted but
rather a newfangled creation of the Federal Rules, meant to be applied sparingly and only ad hoc.
See id. at 817-18. In analyzing the absence of "indicia of reliability," the Court compared the
statement admitted under the residual exception to statements admitted under more fixed and
respected hearsay exceptions. In dicta, the Court explained that under some exceptions, "the
declarant'struthfulnessis so clear from surroundingcircumstancesthat the test of cross-examination
would be of marginal utility." Id. at 820. It cited the excited utterance as an example of such
trustworthyhearsay. The Courtexplained that the "basis for the 'excited utterance' exception.., .is
that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication,
coaching, or confabulation." Id.
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Nonetheless,the excitedutteranceexceptionis not as clearlyestablished as the Supreme Court and commentators suggest. For example,
in White v. Illinois, the Court recently held that an excited utteranceof a
four-year-old girl overcame ConfrontationClause concerns because the
utterance fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception.54 The Court
concluded that hearsay that qualifies as an excited utterance "is so trustworthy that adversarialtesting can be expected to add little to its reliability."55 Yet, as proof of the "firmly rooted" nature of the excited
utterance,Chief Justice Rehnquist,writing for the majority, simply cited
its adoption as part of the Federal Rules and by most states. The Chief
Justice listed only two sources of precedent: Wigmore's treatise and the
1693 case of Thompson v. Trevanion.56
The contemporaryexcited utteranceexception also presents several
recurrentdoctrinal problems, including when to characterizean event as
sufficiently exciting or stressful, and how to prove that the event actually
occurred (in other words, whether the statement itself can prove the exciting event, or whether the proponent must adduce evidence independent of the statement)." Most notably, courts continue to struggle with
the timing question, trying to establish the maximum time that may
elapse between the event and the statement for the declaration to fall
within the exception.58 According to the Advisory Committee note,
"the standard of measurement is the duration of the state of excitement."59 This is clearly a fact-bound inquiry; in fact, courts look for
indications of continuing excitement based on many diverse factors,
such as the natureof the startlingevent and the age and temperament of
54. 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992). The Court in Whitepurportedlyadhered to the standardit
articulatedin Ohio v. Roberts,448 U.S. 56 (1980), which it interpretedas holding that use of "firmly
rooted" hearsay exceptions do not violate an accused's right to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment. See also Wright,497 U.S. at 805.
55. White,502 U.S. at 357 (citing Wright,497 U.S. at 820-21). Criticismof the Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence is widespread. Professor Eleanor Swift has aptly described the Court's
opinion in Whiteas "overbroad,unjustified and embarrassing." Eleanor Swift, Smoke and Mirrors:
The Failure of the SupremeCourt'sAccuracy Rationale in White v. Illinois Requires a New Look at
Confrontation,22 CAP.U. L. REV. 145, 152 (1993). For the purposes of this inquiry, however, it is
interestingto observe the Court's confidence in the excited utteranceexception.
56. See White, 502 U.S. at 355 n.8. This is particularly troubling given the prospect that
Thompsonv. Trevanion,Skinner402 (1693), is subjectto alternate interpretations,and that Wigmore
shaped the doctrinemuch more than merely restatingit. See supra note 32.
57. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(2) advisory committee's note (commenting on question of
EVIDENCE,supra note 22, ? 803(2)[01].
proving the startlingevent); WEINSTEIN'S
58. See MCCORMICK,supra note 7, ? 272 (casting the temporal element as probably the most
importantof the many factorsenteringinto the determination);see also Haggins v. Warden, 715 F.2d
1050, 1057-58 (6th Cir. 1983) (weighing whethera child's statement made an hour and a half after
the event should be excluded).
59. FED.R. EVID.803(2) advisory committee's note. The advisorycommitteequestions, "How
long can excitement prevail? Obviously there are no pat answers and the character of the
transaction or event will largely determine the significance of the time factor." Id. (citing M.C.
Slough, SpontaneousStatementsand State of Mind,46 IOWAL. REV.224, 243 (1961)).
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the declarant."6However,such a fact-boundinquiryproduces widely
results. In some cases,a lapse of an hour is
varyingandunpredictable
too long, while in other,albeitrare,cases, twentyhours of continuous
agitationmeetsthe excitedutterancestandard.6'
Moreover,despitecodificationof the evidencerule,trialjudges still
possess enormous discretion in deciding whether to admit these
statements.Wheresympathyexists for the victim,particularlyin child
abuse cases,courtsoften stretchthe excited utterancedoctrinebeyond
andin extendingthe time thatthe
recognition-both in imputingstress62
declarantis under the influence of that stresswell beyond traditional
limits.63
The willingnessof some courts to stretchthe doctrinalrequirements,though understandableand sometimeseven admirable,causes
60. See,e.g., Peoplev. Soto,35 Cal.Rptr.2d 846,860 (Ct.App. 1994)(describingvictim,who
madean excitedutterancewithinfour hoursof the attack,as "eithercrying,wringingher hands,
coveringherface,avertinghereyes fromwhomeverwastalkingto heror talkingabouthow scared,
upsetand nervousshe was");Peoplev. Brown,517 N.E.2d515, 519 (N.Y. 1987) (citingspecific
factorssuch as the victim's"hemorrhagic
shock"andresuscitation
in additionto lack of time to
reflect in the thirtyminutesbetweenthe shootingand the victim'semergencyroom statementas
indications
of spontaneity).
61. ComparePacificov. State,642 So. 2d 1178, 1187(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (excluding
statementmadeonly approximately
one hourafter a violentrapeas an excitedutterancebecause
"thetimelapse betweenthe sexualencounterand the victim'sstatementsto her roommateswas
sufficientto permitreflectivethought")
and Handelv. New YorkRapidTransitCorp.,297 N.Y.S.
216 (App.Div. 1937),affd mem.,13 N.E.2d468 (N.Y. 1938)(excludingstatementmadetwo and
one-halfminutesafter declaranthad been draggedby a train)withStatev. Stipek,995 OhioApp.
LEXIS1355,at *3 (OhioCt.App. 1995)(holdingthatthe "preciseamountof timethatmay lapse
beforea statementloses its spontaneity
as anexcitedutterance
cannotbe establishedby any absolute
ruleof law"andfindingno abuseof discretionwherestatements
to survivor'sboyfriendmadefourto
six weeksafterthe allegedoffensewereallowedas excitedutterances)and Peoplev. Houghteling,
455 N.W.2d440 (Mich.Ct.App. 1990)(admitting
statementof five-year-oldmade20 hoursafter
assault).
62. See RobertP. Mosteller,Remaking ConfrontationClause and Hearsay Doctrine Under the
Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL.L. REv. 691, 706 n.68 (1993). Courts

also tendto creditchildren'sstatementsaboutsexualassaultbecausetheydo notbelieve children
havesufficientknowledgeor sophistication
to fabricatesexualencounters.See,e.g., Statev. Logue,
372 N.W.2d151, 159(S.D. 1985)(holdingthatstatements
madeby four-year-old
boyto his motherin
normalcourseof dailyactivitiestwo to three days after the traumaticevent, "coupledwith the
inabilitywe perceiveof the childto fabricatean accountof sucha heinoussexualencounter,
warrant
a findingthatthe statements
wereexcitedutterances").
63. See Mosteller,supranote 62 (explainingexpansionof allowabletimeperiodbetweenthe
excitingevent and hearsaystatement"undera theorythatthe psychologicalcharacteristicsof
childreneithercause excitementto inhibitreflectivethoughtfor a longerperiodof timeor greatly
minimizethatdanger[of fabrication]");
see also McCORMICK,
supranote7, ? 272.1,at 478 ("many
courtshave liberallyinterpreted
the allowableperiodof timebetweenthe excitingevent and the
child'sdescription
of it"). See, e.g., Guamv. Ignacio,10 F.3d608, 615 (9th Cir. 1993)(holdingthat
thetimefactormaybe lengthened
in casesof molestation
by adultmalefamilymembersbecauseit is
traumatic);
particularly
Morganv. Foretich,846 F.2d941, 947-48(4th Cir. 1988) ("tenderyears"
reducelikelihoodof "reflection
andfabrication");
Statev. Smith,337 S.E.2d833, 842-43(N.C. 1985)
(holdingthattimelapse of two to threedays stillresultedin admissibleutterance). See generally
Harrington,
supranote28 (dividingexcitedutterances
minorsfromadults).
by timeanddistinguishing
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confusion and inconsistency." Although such resortto legal fiction
may seem compassionatein individualcases,the legal standardhas become undesirablymuddled.As a result,the excitedutteranceexception
sometimesoperatesas the unofficial garbage pail of hearsay exceptions.65It occasionallyfunctionsas a de facto residualexceptionwithout the doctrinallimitationsof the narrowly-drawn
residual hearsay
exceptioncurrentlycodifiedunderthe rules.66
the problemis not as simple as judges ignoring the
Furthermore,
formal requirementsof a silly rule to achieve a fair result. Judicial
stretchingof the excited utteranceexceptionis by natureselectiveand
motivatedby a distinctpointof view. Whilesomejudges seem reluctant
to allow legal formalismto triumph,othersadhereto the doctrinerigidly.67Suchliteraland unbendingapplicationsof the excited utterance
withrespectto issuesof timing,ariseeven in symdoctrine,particularly
cases.
the excitedutteranceexceptionis appliedin a
Therefore,
pathetic
chaotic and idiosyncraticmanner;this inconsistencybespeaksunfairness andunequaltreatmentof similarout-of-courtstatements.
These inconsistentresponsesby judges revealsbasic flaws in the
doctrineand, perhaps,in the hearsayrule itself. Moreover,as the next
Sectionshows,thereis reasonto doubtthatthe excited utteranceexception's relianceon timingandstressguaranteestrustworthiness.
64.
Cf. LaurenRobel, FracturedProcedure: The Civil Justice ReformAct of 1990, 46 STAN.L
REV. 1447 (1994) (explaining the importanceof uniformityand predictabilityin proceduralrules).
65. See State v. Parker, 730 P.2d 921, 924 (Idaho 1986) ("In sex crime cases, the excited
utteranceexception often receives broaderapplicationthan in other cases."); John E. B. Myers, The
Child Sexual Abuse Literature:A Call for Greater Objectivity, 88 MICH.L. REV. 1709, 1729-30
(1990) (book review) (noting the "particularlytroublesome"expansive use of the excited utterance
in child abuse cases).
66.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) provides residual,or catch-all, exceptions to the hearsay
rule. Rule 803(24) excepts from the hearsayrule "a statementnot specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantialguarantees of trustworthiness.... " FED.
R. EvID. 803(24). The court may admitthe statementupon a finding that the statement is offered as
evidence of a materialfact, that it is more probativeon the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponentcan procurethroughreasonableefforts, and that the general purposes
of the Rules and interestsof justice will be best served by the admissionof the statement. See id. The
proponentof the statementmust give notice to the adverse party in advance. See id. Rulings made
under the residual exception have no precedentialeffect. See WEINSTEIN
& BURGER,
supra note 22,
? 803(24)[01] (noting that catchall decisions have only limited precedential effect); Thomas M.
Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IowA L. REV. 413, 452
(1989) ("Because a proper determinationunder the catchall exception is largely dependent on the
peculiarities of the particular trial, trial court rulings under the catchall exception and appellate
affirmances or reversals legitimately carry no precedentialvalue.").
67. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d 445, 449 (Utah 1989) ("While it is true that the victim
was still underthe stress and shock of the assault, we believe that we would be pushing the limits of
the rule to hold admissible the entire contents of this one-hourinterview as an 'excited utterance."');
People v. Brown, 524 N.E.2d 742, 747-78 (I11.App. Ct. 1988) (holding that 50 minutes from event to
statement, and victim's reflection on whether she should call the police 10-15 minutes before her
statementwas made, constituted"pauseto reflect [that] negated the spontaneityof her statement").
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C. The Psychological Critiqueof the
Excited UtteranceDoctrine
The excited utterance exception has been subjected to extensive
psychological criticism. While this Article does not comprehensively
examine this critique of the doctrine, it does outline it. Perhaps what is
most remarkableis not the critique itself but the continued resilience of
the excited utterancedoctrine in the face of this persuasive psychological critique. This persistence despite decades of criticism demonstrates
the entrenchment of the doctrine and prompts inquiry regarding the
special hold that the excited utterancedoctrine has on our jurisprudence
and culture.
Today, Wigmore's description of the effect of stress seems primitive and one-sided. His analysis of the effect of stress-that it stills conscious thought-undervalues other factors in the complicated process of
perception. From a functional as well as a philosophical point of view,
Wigmore's theory underestimatesthe vast cognitive processes that transpire as part of any utterance. Even as a declarant spontaneously yells,
"MY GOD, the car ran the red light!" he is thinking, making choices,
processing images, translatingthose images, and choosing words. It is,
therefore, hard to divine what part of that complicated process is deliberate and what part is "instinctive" or "impulsive."68
Furthermore,despite its intuitive appeal, Wigmore's notion that a
person would not have time to think up a lie before making an excited
utterance in response to a startling event is not borne out by psychological research. The time required to craft a lie is slight-sometimes
only a matter of seconds.69 The excited utterance exception, which tolerates more than a thirty-minute gap between the event and the utterance, allows more than sufficient time for planning a false report.

68. See Stanley A. Goldman,Distorted Vision:SpontaneousExclamationsas a "FirmlyRooted"
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 23 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 453, 459 (1990) (questioningthe "assumption
that descriptive accuracy is a naturalconsequence of immediate observation");Stewart, supra note
16 at 29 ("[E]ven without considering falsification and the distorting effect of excitement,
contemporaneousutterancesare subject to distortion in the declarant's perception and memory (the
declarationneed only be substantiallycontemporaneous)as well as the perceptionand memory of the
reporting witness.").
69.
See RobertM. Hutchins& Donald Slesinger, Some Observationson the Law of Evidence,
28 COLUM.L. REV.432, 437 (1928) (assertingthat the difference in reactiontime between deceptive
and sincere responses is negligible). Psychological studies supportthis observation and indicate that
the difference between the time of cognition and the time when the declarantmay begin to fabricate
is so small that it is often impossibleto measurewithoutinstruments. See Goldman, supra note 68, at
460 (arguing that "the hearsay statement would have to be spoken virtually simultaneouslywith the
described event for even the slightest assurance of increased reliability");Quick, supra note 22, at
210 (noting psychological studies questioningthe argumentthatspontaneityis a reasonable guarantee
of sincerity); Stewart supra note 16, at 28 n.126 (citing HAROLDERNESTBURTT, LEGAL
PSYCHOLOGY
(1931)).
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the excited utterancedoctrine'semFinally,andmost importantly,
on
obfuscates
the
much
morepressingissues of percepphasis sincerity
tion and memory.7 It reflects the disproportionateconcern that
evidencelaw evincesfor deliberatefalsification,as comparedwithhonest error producedby the normal operationof cognitive processes."
Psychologicalreorderingand confabulationpermeateall humanobservation;they do not necessarilyariseout of a desire to lie, but merely
reflect the complex processof human perception. The psychological
literatureindicatesthatperceivingandremembering
are more decisively
mattersof constructionthan mechanicalrecordingand reproduction.72
If twentieth-century
intellectualthoughthas taughtus anything,it is how
intricatehuman thought and awarenessare, and yet how generally
obliviouswe areto theirprocesses.
70. As my colleagues ProfessorsJeffrey Rachlinskyand Alex Tanford have explained to me, a
person experiences a series of cognitive stages in translatinga live event into a witness' testimony:
sensation (the activation of neuralreceptorsin response to stimuli); perception(the automatic process
of assembling sensations into a mentalrepresentationof the world);encoding (moving the perception
into memory); storage (keeping the memory intact); and retrieval (retrieving the event from longterm memory). See CHARLES
G. MORRIS,
AN INTRODUCTION
PSYCHOLOGY:
232-238 (9th ed. 1996)
(discussing sensation, perception, encoding, and retrieval). Breakdown at any one of these stages
will result in an inaccurate or incomplete memory. For instance, if observers do not have enough
time to process and encode the event, they may engage in perceptual confabulation, whereby their
overloadedbrains unconsciously attemptto fill in the gaps in information. See CLIFFORD
& BULL,
THE PSYCHOLOGY
OFPERSON
IDENTIFICATION
17-18 (1978).
There are at least three types of memory: (1) sensory memory, lasting less than one second (just
DICTIONARY
OF PSYCHOLOGY
long enough to store sensory information),see THEENCYCLOPEDIC
207 (Terry F. Pettijohneditorial adviser, 4th ed. 1991); (2) short-term memory, defined as "the
working memory that contains informationcurrentlyin use being acted upon and in consciousness";
and (3) long-term memory, which corresponds to "everything we 'know."' MORRIS,
supra at 234.
Excited utterance concerns long-term memory--even if the utterance was made only five minutes
after the startlingevent. Memory of five minutes ago is linked to long-term memory rather than
short-termmemory because short-termmemory is not measuredmerely by time elapsed between an
event and recalling that event. Rather, it is measured in terms of the capacity to hold a certain
amount of informationin the working consciousness. Once informationhas left consciousness, or
short-termmemory, it is storedas long-term memory, or lost in 15 to 20 seconds. See CHARLES
G.
MORRIS, PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 226-29, 234 (7th ed. 1990); YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 57-62 (1979) (charting various types of memory and listing short-term
as that which can be retainedfor 15-20 seconds).
71. This highlights a fundamentalquestion underlyingthe hearsay doctrine: Why is sincerity
the emphasis of so many exceptions to the hearsay rule? Of the four hearsay dangers (perception,
memory, narration,and sincerity) why does solving the problem of sincerity seem to assuage the
other three concerns about reliability? Honest people can be wrong. There is a wealth of literature
on the unreliabilityof eyewitness testimony. See D.S. Greer, AnythingBut the Truth?The Reliability
of Testimonyin CriminalTrials, 11 BRIT.J. CRIMINOLOGY 131, 133-35 (1971), quoted in Steven I.
Friedland,On CommonSense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASEW. RES. L. REV.
165, 167 n.14 (1990) (discussing inaccuracy of juries in evaluating eyewitness testimony). One
explanation for the emphasis on sincerity stems from Professor Imwinkelried's hypothesis of the
"worst evidence principle." Our fear of lying witnesses surpasses, and perhaps overwhelms, any
other reliability concerns. See Imwinkelried,supra note 10.
72. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 10 (quoting F. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING 204, 205
(paperback ed. 1967)).
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For decades,scholarshave attackedthe wisdomof fashioning an
exception to the hearsay rule that depends upon the excited and stressful state of the speaker.7 Although the psychological evidence is
mixed, the standard psychological critique questions the reliability of
excited utterances.74Whereas the excited utterance exception is premised on the notion that stress leads to sincerity, many scholars instead
propose that extreme stress leads to confusion.7 Even assuming that the
declarant's sincerity is enhanced by his or her agitated state, the reliability of the excited utterancemay in fact be counterbalanced, or even
outweighed, by the declarant's diminished perception and memory.'7
Declarants' startledutterances may be honest declarations of what they

73.
In fact, the first criticisms of the excited utterance exception are almost as old as
Wigmore's formulationof the doctrineitself. In a famous 1928 article, entitled Some Observations
on the Law of Evidence, Professors Hutchins and Slesinger raised practical and psychological
concerns about courts' treatmentof spontaneousdeclarations. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note
69. They noted that courts tended to favor excited utterances over present sense impressions, and
that courts felt most comfortableadmittingevidence where the declarant was under the stress of an
exciting event. See id. at 433. They argued that the reverse should be true, and that present sense
impressions, utteredprecisely while the event transpired,were more reliable. See id. at 440. The
excited utteranceexception, because it allows a brief time lag between the event and the exclamation
and depends on excitement to ensure sincerity, was, in the estimationof Hutchins and Slesinger, less
reliable, although still admissible. See id.; see also David P. Leonard, Perspective on Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence 413-415: The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Political Process, 22
FORDHAMURB. L.J. 305, 315 (1995) (discussing the questionable psychology of the excited
utterance);Moorehead,supra note 22, at 203 (criticizing the excited utterance and asking "[w]ould
you entrustyour life to the judgmentor perceptionof a person who is acting under extreme stress or
trauma?").
74. See JAMES MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT 16 (1966) (criticizing the
excited utterancebecause it ignores "the distortingimpact of trauma on the capacity to perceive");
MCCORMICK, supra note 7, ? 272, at 476 ("Theentire basis for the exception is, of course, subject to
question. While psychologists would probably concede that excitement minimizes the possibility of
reflective self-interest influencing the declarant's statements, they have questioned whether this
might be outweighed by the distorting effect of shock and excitement upon the declarant's
observation and judgement.");KennethA. Deffenbacher, The Influence of Arousal on Reliability of
235, 236 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R.
Testimony,in EVALUATINGWITNESSEVIDENCE
Clifford eds., 1983) (criticizing the apparent view of American courts that heightened arousal
increases accuracy of memory).
75. Stress is defined as "environmentalchallenges severe enough to threaten psychological or
physiological well-being." PETER D. SPEAR ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES ON BEHAVIOR 545
(1988). The terms stress, excitement, and arousal are used interchangeably. See Deffenbacher,
supra note 74 (using "stress," "arousal," and "excitement" interchangeably). Stress can infect the
complicated process of imprinting,absorbing, and receiving information. See id. at 247-48 (noting
lack of empirical support for idea that high levels of arousal facilitate eyewitness testimony, and
noting that violence may further impair witness testimony). The "startlingevent" of the excited
utterance rule, which typically includes accidents and violent crimes, clearly falls within the
psychological definition of stress, even if the declarantis only a bystanderas opposed to a participant
or a victim.
76.
Or as Hutchinsand Slesinger concluded, "What the emotion gains by way of overcoming
the desire to lie, it loses by impairingthe declarant'spower of observation." Hutchins & Schlesinger,
supra note 69, at 439.
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thoughtthey saw, butthe verystressthatmakesthem so honest can also
interferewith theirabilityto perceive,transcribe,andrememberevents.7
One prominentpsychologicaltheory of stressand memory posits
thatthe level of fear or stressexperiencedin acquiringinformationinfluencesthe qualityof informationstoredin long-termmemory.78 Besides the distractingexcitementitself, there may be strong personal
feelings evoked by the startlingeventthataffect memory and perception.79Thesefactorsconspireto underminethe accuracyof the excited
statementand, in turn,raise seriousquestionsabout the theory of the
excited utteranceexception.
77. In 1937, Professor Morgan similarly criticized the trend toward requiring a startling
occurrence for res gestae. The requirement"seems a decided mistake, for it insists upon an element
which has a positive tendency to produce inaccurate observation-and inaccuracy of observation is
one of the greatestobstacles to the discovery of facts in litigation." EdmundM. Morgan, Res Gestae,
12 WASH.L. REV.91, 98 (1937).
78.

See ELIZABETHF. LoFTus & JAMESM. DOYLE, EYEWITNESSTESTIMONY:CIVIL AND

CRIMINAL
47-51 (1987). The complex role of stress in perceptionand the efficiency of memory has
been encapsulated in the Yerkes-Dodson law. See id. at 48. The Yerkes-Dodson law posits the
existence of an optimal stress level in which the observerperformsat his perceptual peak. Too little
stress, and the observer's nervous system may not function fully. See id. Without any arousal or
anxiety the observer may pay insufficient attention. Too much stress, however, impairs perception
and memory, creating a "disorganizingeffect." The Yerkes-Dodsoncurve plots the level of arousal
against the efficiency of memory as measuredby task performance. See Deffenbacher, supra note
75, at 237. For tasks of any real complexity, the relationshipbetween arousal and performance is
curvilinear. The optimal stress level varies with the natureof the activity. The more excited a person
is, the less complexity he can handle. See id. Excited utterances concern higher than optimal stress
levels. See id. at 247 ("[A]rousal levels engendered by crimes of violence, homicides, rapes,
assaults, armed robberies, are almost invariably going to be greater than the Yerkes-Dodson
optimum, given the reasonablehigh complexity of the task expected of eyewitnesses."). Clifford and
Bull observed that "[u]nder conditions of stress, anxiety and fear the level of cognitive complexity
used to perceive with may be very sub-optimal." CLIFFORD
& BULL,supra note 70, at 51. Perhaps
the closest simulationof the condition of excited utterance stems from staged exciting events or
violent films, after which the observer's perception and memory are tested. Clifford and Hollin
conducted an experimentwhere subjects viewed films with varying levels of violence. The subjects'
arousal was measuredby galvanic skin responses. Photographicidentificationwas less accurate for
subjects viewing the more violent film, and such subjects' lower recall of the perpetrators' personal
characteristics was statisticallysignificant. See Deffenbacher, supra note 75, at 244 (citing B.R.
Clifford & C.R. Hollin, Effects of the Type of Incident and Number of Perpetrators on Eyewitness
364-70 (1981)). Loftus and Burns showed witnesses either a
Memory, 66 J. APPLIEDPSYCHOL.
violent or a non-violent version of a bank robbery. The observers shown the violent film where a
young boy is shot in the face recalled and recognized less detail from the film. See id. at 245 (citing
E.F. Loftus & T.E. Burns,MentalShock Can Produce Retrograde Amnesia (1981) (paper presented
at meetings of the Psychonomic Society, Philadelphia)). In addition,the experimenters showed that
the memory impairmentderived from the shock of the violent episode ratherthan merely the surprise
of the hold-up. See id. Finally, in a simulated robbery which transpiredin a classroom of over one
hundred unsuspecting college students, researchers found that students who reported less stress
during the incident were significantly more accurate in identifying the thief. CLIFFORD& BULL,
supra note 70, at 53-54.
79.
Loftus and Doyle cite evidence that people who experience natural disasters, such as
floods or earthquakes,often remembervery little, particularlywhen the memories are painful. See
id. at 32. Anotherstudy indicates that the more violent and emotion-provokingthe crime, the less well
it will be remembered. See id. at 51.
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Additionally, some psychological data indicate that, as a selfprotectivedevice, witnesses may initially suppress unpleasant memories,
which only emerge in later, calmer times." Such data argue directly
against application of the excited utterance exception, because the witness' ability to recall will not be at its best so near in time to the traumatic event.
The picture that emerges from the recent psychological literature
on the effect of stress on memory, however, is neither simple nor particularly coherent. Some of the early works on stress and accuracy may
be criticized because they fail to consider the connection between the
stressful event and the particular facts to be remembered. Similarly,
they do not account for the type of information to be remembered.81
Moreover, some modem psychologists dispute the notion that stress always diminishes accurate observation, and argue instead that arousal
may improve accurate memory of certain central information.82 These
psychologists assert that an excited event can occupy all of a person's
working short-term memory. As a result, the person becomes focused
on the event and cannot think about anything else. This circumstance
thus impedes the person's ability to fabricate.83
Fortunately,this Article need not stake out a position on this debate
within psychology because the excited utterance exception, as currently
applied, makes no sense under either theory. Even assuming that stress
has a positive, focusing effect, that effect is short lived, because it applies
to short-termmemory. The excited utterance exception, however, routinely admits statements made thirty minutes after the exciting event.
This gap in time is too long to obtain the benefit from this postulated
window of sincerity.
For the purposes of this Article, the more important conclusion is
that the excited utterance doctrine remains vibrant despite serious psychological criticisms of its efficacy and wisdom. Whatever the merits of
the traditional psychological critique, it is fascinating and telling that a
powerful and longstanding critique of the excited utterance doctrine
exists, and yet the doctrine has remained widely accepted and applied,

80. See Sven-Ake Christianson,EmotionalStress and Eyewitness Memory: A CriticalReview,
BULL.284, 290-94 (1992) (noting the central features of unpleasantevents may be
112 PSYCHOL.
better rememberedthan neutralevents, but such enhanced memory will occur after a lapse of time).
81.
Additionally, some of these early experiments did not adequately account for the many
variables that may affect the experimentaloutcomes, including the nature of the stressful event, the
level and durationof stress actually experienced,and the variationsin individual stress tolerance. In
fact, a persistent problem with the psychological research stems from the ethical limitationson
scientists in inducing stress levels equivalentto those caused by violent crimes or car accidents.
82. See Howard Egeth, Emotion and the Eyewitness, in THE HEART'SEYE: EMOTIONAL
IN PERCEPTION
INFLUENCES
ANDATTENTION
257-58 (P.M. Neidenthal& S. Kitayamaeds., 1994).
83. See id.
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and even venerated." A feministanalysis,examininghow the excited
utteranceexceptionrepresentsandperhapseven influencesculturalvalues, may explainthe tenacityof the doctrinein the face of such scholarlycriticism.85
III
A FEMINISTPERSPECTIVE
A. Difference,Dominance,and EvidentiaryObjectivity

to respect
Modemfeminism,whichgrewoutof a consciousattempt
to extools
voices
and
has
women's
experiences, developedanalytical
aminehowthosevoicesareheardandhowthoseexperiences
areprocessed.86ProfessorDeborahRhodehas explainedthat a feministmethod

to genderas a focusof concernandto analytic
"impliesa commitment

approachesthat reflect women's concrete experience.""87 Feminist
methodexaminesthe statusquo to "identifythe gender implicationsof
rulesandpracticeswhichmightotherwiseappearto be neutralor objective."8s It screensfor rulesandculturalnormsthatconflict withthe experience of women, drawing insight from women's psychological
experienceof being "other"89and from women's practicalexperience

84. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's recent
supportfor the doctrine).
85. Of course, anotherexplanation for the excited utterance doctrine's longevity may be that
jurists generally disregard the advice of evidence scholars and psychologists. Here, for obvious
reasons, I eschew Occam's razor, which prefers the simplest of all competing theories. See A.
Samuel Oddi, Un-UnifiedEconomic Theoriesof Patents-The Not-Quite-Holy-Grail,71 NOTREDAME
L. REV.267, 285 n.128 (1996).
86. Some argue that modernfeminism arose from consciousness-raisinggroups and attemptsto
speak out against gender inequalities. See Leslie Bender,A Lawyer'sPrimer on Feminist Theory and
Tort,38 J. LEGALEDUC.3, 9 (1988) (describing consciousness-raising as the process of validating
women's experience and learning from these experiences). Although feminists disagree about how
to interpret women's experiences and what to do about them, all feminists are dedicated to the
fundamentalgoal of eliminatingthe oppressionof women. See Lynne Henderson, Law's Patriarchy,
25 L. & Soc'Y REV.411, 417 (1991) (noting the sharedgoal of all branchesof feminism to eradicate
women's subordinatestatus).
87.
DeborahL. Rhode, The "NoProblem"Problem:FeministChallengesand Cultural Change,
100 YALELJ. 1731, 1736 (1991); see Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the
WOMEN'SL.J. 191, 195 (1989-90) ("[T]here does appear to be general
Theories, 4 BERKELEY
agreementthat feminist method begins with the primacy of women's experience.").
88. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, reprinted in FEMINISTLEGALTHEORY:
READINGS
IN LAWAND GENDER
370, 371 (Katharine T. Bartlett& Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991)
(describing this as "the woman question"). Bartlettpresents a method for feminist analysis that is
designed to "reveal features of a legal issue which more traditional methods tend to overlook or
suppress." Id. at 371-74.
89.
See id. at 385 (discussing "feminist standpointepistemology," which "identifies woman's
status as that of victim, and then privileges thatstatusby claiming that it gives access to understanding
about oppression that others cannot have").
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of unequal treatment.90In doing so, feminist method sheds light on
culturalbiases,exposes powerdifferencesbetweenthe sexes, and challenges the cultural,social,andlegal statusquo.
In applyinga feministmethodto evidence law, this Article draws
on two importantschools of feminism: "difference feminism," also
knownas relationalor culturalfeminism,and "dominance,"or radical,
feminism. I have chosenthesetwo schools of thoughtbecausethey are
the most prominentand current,and because they are rich in theory.
Drawingon political,philosophical,andsocio-linguisticcontributionsto
understandinggender in our society, differenceand dominancefeminism offer excellenttools for analyzingevidencelaw.
Differencefeminismpositsthatwomen,as a resultof their socialized roles, or perhaps(morecontroversially)theirnaturalpropensities,91
perceiveand think aboutthe worlddifferentlyfrom the way that men
do. Strongly influencedby the "ethic of care" articulatedby Nel
differencefeministsargue that women
Noddings and CarolGilligan,92
have unique ways of knowingand relatingthatdiffer from men's approaches.Withoutclaimingthatthis differentvoice is descriptiveof all
women,93or necessarilybetterthanthe approachused by men (although
this is sometimesimplied),thesefeministshaveattemptedto identify the
nature of a "different voice." Difference feminists contend that
whereasmen's interactionsare often governedby hierarchyand status,
90. See generally Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
PhenomenologicalCritiqueof FeministLegal Theory, 3 Wis. WOMEN'SL.J. 81 (1987) (arguing that
women experience pain differently from men, and that feminist method should describe women's
subjective lives, especially their differing painful experiences). For some concrete observations
about how law and legal language prefer a male perspective, see Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking
Women'sSilence in Law: The Dilemma of the GenderedNatureof Legal Reasoning,64 NOTREDAME
L. REV.886, 898 & nn. 56-61 (1989).
91. Even among difference feminists, there are serious differences. Some difference feminists
seem to argue that women's differences from men derive from the essential nature of women
themselves, emanating, if not from biology, then from biologically driven roles stemming from
women's potential for childbirthand nursing. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988) ("Underlying both radical and cultural feminism is a conception of
women's existential state that is grounded in women's potential for physical, material connection to
human life.") Others emphasize emotional and social experiences of young girls from a
psychoanalytic perspective and attributewomen's connectednessto the fact that, unlike boys, girls do
not have to reject their mothers. See, e.g., NANCY CHODOROW,THE REPRODUCTION
OF
MOTHERING
167 (1978) (exploring the differenteffects of the Oedipus complex on boys and girls).
92.

See

generally

NEL NODDINGS,

CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS & MORAL

EDUCATION
IN A DIFFERENT
VOICE(1982).
(1984); CAROLGILLIGAN,
93. Difference feminists have been accused of ignoring differences among women. For
instance, women of color have felt that the feminist movement represents only white, middle-class
women, "the pamperedoppressed"(to use a phrase of Alice Walker's) who do not have to deal with
the complicating factors of race and poverty. Some lesbians feel ignored and alienatedby difference
feminists' emphasis on childbirth and nursing in describing women's unique experience and
connectedness.

See generally

ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIALWOMAN: PROBLEMS OF

EXCLUSION
IN FEMINISTTHOUGHT
(1988); Cain, supra note 87; Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialismin FeministLegal Theory,42 STAN.L. REV.581 (1990).
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women tend to rely on "webs of interconnectedness."''94
Difference
feminists identify the masculine voice as one that settles disputes
through organizedconflict such as war or litigation.95The feminine
voice, on the other hand, approachesproblems through consensus
building.96 In light of women's focus on relationships,the feminine
voice tendsto eschewabstractrights-basedarguments9and insteadprefers to immerseitself in the particularsof problems,seeking contextbased solutions.98Differencefeministsaffirmativelyrecognizeand even
celebratetheseuniqueways of thinking,knowing,andrelating.
94.
GILLIGAN,
supra note 92, at 24-36, quoted and discussed in Bender, supra note 86, at 2830. Almost all feminists agree that personalrelationshipsand connections with other people form an
importantaspect of women's experience. See Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CHI. L
REV. 1, 14 (1988) ("Underlying both radical and cultural feminism is a conception of women's
existential state that is grounded in women's potential for physical, material connection to human
life .... ").
95. As ProfessorCarrieMenkel-Meadownotes in Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN'SL.J. 39, 50-51 (1985) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, Portia in a Different Voice], the adversarysystem relies on a strict hierarchyand a clash of
rights, ultimatelydividing the partiesinto categories of winners and losers. Professor Leslie Bender
contends that the adversarysystem is "[i]n many ways ... an intellectualizedsubstitutefor duelling or
medieval jousting. Much of legal practice is a win-lose performance, full of one-upmanship and
bravado." Bender, supra note 2, at 7. The culture of the adversary system and the evidence rules
themselves promote a gaming atmosphere. See Kinports,supra note 2, at 426-27. The language of
advocacy is gendered and bellicose, full of sports and war analogies and "masculine"imagery. See,
e.g., EMILYCOURIC,THE TRIALLAWYERS:THE NATION'S TOP LITIGATORSTELL How THEY WIN

ix (1988) (referringto trial lawyers as "the shock troops of the legal profession").
Some feminists have rejected the notion that litigationand adversariness is per se male and
have examined feminist principles for litigation. For example, Menkel-Meadow has revisited her
position in the Portia articles in a piece entitledPortia Redux:AnotherLookat Gender,Feminism and
Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 75, 86-97 (1994) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Portia
Redux], in which she claims that although women may first turn to negotiation and consensus, they
also have the skills of the adversarysystem, including sharplawyering and technical interpretations.
96.
See DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND 149-87 (1990) (discussing
women's tendency to avoid direct conflict and to try to maintainconsensus and cohesion within a
group); see also Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice, supra note 95, at 40 (summarizing
psychological and sociological researchthat "haspostulatedthat women grow up in the world with a
more relationaland affiliational concept of self than do men").
97. Professor Katharine Bartlett addresses the general claim "that women approach the
reasoning process differently than men do." According to Bartlett,the argumentruns that women are
"more sensitive to situationand context, that they resist universal principles and generalizations,
especially those that do not fit their own experiences, and that they believe that 'the practicalities of
everyday life' should not be neglected for the sake of abstractjustice." Bartlett,supra note 88, at
377. ProfessorBartlettis clearly skepticalof these claims. She notes that "thisreasoning process has
taken on normative significance for feminists." Id. Bartlettrightly points out that feminist method
requiresthe process of abstraction. See id. at 380. It is not the process of abstractionbut rather the
absence of practicalreasoning, and the failure to integrateemotion and experience with logic that the
feminist method tries to redress. See id.
98. See TANNEN,supra note 96, at 91 (discussing "women's tendency to use personal
experience and examples, rather than abstract argumentation"); Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal
Jurisprudence and Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls' Theory of
Justice, 16 N.M. L. REV.613, 620 (1986) (noting that "[t]ime and again women have found that their
own experiences are more valuable truth-seekingtools than the abstractionsof others"); Menkel-
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Differencefeminismhas been assailedon many fronts,including
challengesby liberalswho insiston precise parity"and by those who
bristleat the notionthat womenhave somehowcorneredthe marketon
caring,contextualizedjudgment."XDifferencefeminism,however,rejects "equality" as a sterileand ultimatelyunfair precept,because it
does not accountfor women'sexperiencesandmindset."0'
Moreover,in
response to the criticismthat difference feminists have arrogatedto
themselvesall the desirable,"cuddly" qualities,it is importantto note
that difference feminism,though not the exclusive proponent of the
values inherentin the ethic of care,has neverthelessbeen the primary
force in bringingsuch valuesto bearon legal doctrineandlegal culture.
This contributionof feminism and feminist scholarshipis significant
Meadow,Portiain a DifferentVoice,supranote95, at48 (discussingtheworksof CarolGilliganand
Nel Noddings,andobservingthat"[m]enfocus on universalabstractprincipleslikejustice,equality
andfairnessso thattheirworldis safe,predictable
andconstant.Womensolve problemsby seeking
to understand
the contextand relationships
involvedand understandthat universalrules may be
PortiaRedux,supranote95, at 80 (reviewingthe morerecentdata
Menkel-Meadow,
impossible.");
andassertingthat"mostmen,andaboutone-thirdof women,reasonfromrational,abstractprinciples
or rules,like a weighingof competingrights. Womenare morelikely,thoughnot exclusively,to
reasonfroma careperspective
thatrelieson notionsof responsibility,
humanconnection,andcare.")
(footnote omitted). See generally MARY FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING:
THE DEVELOPMENTOF SELF, VOICE,AND MIND (1986) (discussing
women'smethodsof gaining

knowledgeandinformation).
99. Suchcriticismcomes frompeoplewho are skepticalof the existenceof differentvoices
and who are wary of citingdifferences,even if they do exist. They believe that the women's
movementshouldfocuson attaining
andopportunity.
See, e.g., FrancesOlsen,
equalityof treatment
The Sex of Law, in THEPOLITICS
OFLAW453, 458 (David Kairysed., 1990) (noting that the rejection

of the "sexualization
of the dualisms"of rationalandirrational,
active and passive,etc., "is often
of conventionalsex roles"). Feministswho focus on equalityare
accompaniedby ... a disruption
concernedwithlosinggroundon issuesof equalpay and glassceilingsif womenare brandedas
even if thatdifferenceis notnecessarilyperceivedby feministsas bad.The fear is that
"different,",
differencefeminism,whichemphasizesvaluesof nurturing
andempathy,may inadvertently
polarize
the sexes andreinforcebeliefsthatareusedto justifytheoppressionof women. See, e.g., Anne M.
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF.L. REV. 1, 90-91 (1994) (arguing that the ethic of care

obscures"feministeffortsto clarify our understanding
of genderas a patriarchially
constructed
JoanC. Williams,Deconstructing
hierarchyof social differencesand behavioralexpectations");
L. REV.797 (1989) (arguingthat Gilligan'sconstructionof gender reinforces
Gender,87 MICH.
restrictiveand regressivestereotypesof the domesticnurturingwoman);JoanWilliams,Gender
Wars:Selfless Womenin the Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1565-71 (1991) (arguing

thatGilligan'sdifferencefeminismreinforces"neatlymatchedbinaryoppositesintegralto the covert
and also diffusesany challengeto the systemthat
genderingof the liberalpursuitof autonomy,"
autonomous
precludeswomenfrompursuingunconventionally
paths).
100. See John M. Broughton, Women's Rationalityand Men's Virtues: A Critique of Gender
Dualism in Gilligan's Theory of Moral Development, 50 Soc. REs. 597, 635-36 (1983) (criticizing

Gilligan'sbinarylogic and sharp contrastsbetween "male"and "female,"and exposing the
"crossovers"
documented
evenin Gilligan'sowninterviews).
101. Forinstance,"equal"disabilityleave makesno sense where onlywomenbear and nurse

children. See ChristineA. Littleton,ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CALIF.L. REV. 1279, 1285

(1987) (arguingthatmaleandfemale"differences,"
perceivedor real,biologicalor social,shouldbe
aremostnoticeablynot like menwhen they are
costless). Cf Cain,supranote87, at 199("Women
pregnant.").
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whetheror not one believesan "ethic of care" is innatelyor uniquely
feminine.
Perhapsthe most telling critiqueof differencefeminism,however,
emerges from "dominance"feminism, the second branchof feminism
consideredin this Article. Dominancefeminismfocuses on the power
differentialbetweenwomenandmen. It analyzeswomen's place in society by examiningmale subjugationof women,focusing particularly
on sex and sexuality. ProfessorKathrynAbramshas describeddominance feminismas "that strandof feminist (legal) theory that locates
genderoppressionin the sexualizeddominationof womenby men and
the eroticizationof that dominance through pornographyand other
elementsof popularculture.""'02Women's subjugationdoes not stem
solely from discriminationor society's failure to appreciatewomen's
roles and perspectives.1'3
Rather,dominancefeminismtraceswomen's
to
threats
to
women's
oppression
safety and physical integrity. For
dominancefeminists,the organizingicon is not womanas mother,but
woman as survivorof sexual violence and member of a subjugated
class."04
Dominancefeminists,concernedaboutthe perpetuationof gender
stereotypesandthe unwittingdivisionof a complicatedpoliticalstruggle
into "sugarand spice"on the one hand,and "snails and puppy dog's
tails"on the other, rejectmany of the tenetsof differencefeminism.1'5
Dominancefeministsworrythat focusing on differences will merely
102.
Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory, 95
COLUM.L. REV.304, 304 n.l (1995).
103
WOMEN'S
L.J. 63, 80-81
Cf Susan H. Williams, FeministLegal Epistemology,8 BERKELEY
(1993) (arguing that a focus on women's differences "shifts attentionaway from asking about the
institutionaland cultural structuresthat create a norm and generate those differences").
104.

See CATHERINEA. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 149

(1989) ("[A]ll women live all the time underthe shadow of the threatof sexual abuse.").
105. Although dominance feminists realize the importance of supportingwomen, and believe
that celebration of difference is a necessary step forward,they do not believe that women should be
mired in gender-basedstereotypes. No matter how positive those attributesare, as is the case with
women's nurturingnature and empathy, they are also associated with subjugation. As Catharine
MacKinnon has argued,
Beloved of left and right alike, construinggender as a difference, termed simply the gender
difference, obscures and legitimatizes the way gender is imposed by force. It hides that
force behind a static descriptionof gender as a biological or social or mythic or semantic
partition,engraved or inscribed or inculcated by god, nature, society (agents unspecified),
the unconscious, or the cosmos. The idea of gender difference helps keep the reality of
male dominance in place.
CATHARINEA. MACKINNON, FEMINISMUNMODIFIED3 (1987).

MacKinnon also wrote:

The differences we attributeto sex are lines inequalitydraws, not any kind of basis for
it. Social and political inequality are, I think, basically indifferent to sameness and
difference. Differences are inequality's post hoc excuse, its conclusory artifact, its
outcome presentedas its origin, the damage that is pointed to as the justification for doing
the damage after the damage has been done, the distinctions that perception is socially
organized to notice because inequalitygives them consequences for social power.
Id. at 8.
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providefodderfor those who wish to subjugatewomen. For them,celebrationof women's ethic of care echoes traditionalexcuses for sexism
that relied on some of the same qualitiesbut used them to argue that
womenare too anecdotal,emotional,or spiritualfor activeparticipation
in public life. Dominancefeministsargue furtherthat the "different
voice" perpetuatesmale power by objectifyinga male prototypeand
establishingit as the normfromwhichwomenare supposedlydifferent.
Focusingon women's necessarycoping mechanismsin an oppressive
patriarchalsociety,'06dominancefeministstend to see women's connectednessnot as innateor socially desirable,but as a consequenceof
oppression.Womenare nurturingbecause they have been forced and
trainedto be helpful, subservient,and sexually submissiveto men.'17
Dominancefeministsassertthatwomen's voices are not different,but
muted,speakingin the whisperof subjugation.
Despite this serious disagreement,both strandsof feminism are
concernedwith manyof the same practicalissues. Even though dominancefeministssee identifiablegenderdifferencesas a cause for revolution, not celebration, they share with difference feminists a
commitmentto heeding women's storiesand addressingthe practical
problemsthat womenface. Ultimately,both strandsprovide valuable
tools for analyzinglaw as it appliesto these practicalissues. Difference
feminismfocuses on how law may not reflector value the "different"
wayswomenperceiveand react,no matterhow these differencesoriginate. Dominancefeminism, which searchesfor power discrepancies
between men and women, is particularlyconcerned with women's
physicalsafetyandpersonalintegrity.It analyzeshow law may stifle or
silence women.'08

106. Catherine MacKinnon, the predominantdominance feminist, questioned Carol Gilligan
about women's nurturanceand ethics of care:
Whydo women become these people, more than men, who representthese values? This is
the answer is the subordinationof women. That does not
really very important. For
mean that I would throw out
me,....
those values. Those are nice values; everyone should have
them....
What bothersme is identifyingwomen with it. ... I am troubledby the possibility of women
identifying with what is a positively valued femininestereotype.
Dubois, et al., FeministDiscourse, Moral Values,and the Law-A Conversation,34 BUFF.L. REV. 11,
74 (1985).
107. See supra notes 105-106; cf Kathy Alexis Psomiades, The Daughter's Dilemma: Family
Process and the Nineteenth-CenturyDomestic Novel, 20 SIGNs 189, 190 (1994) (book review)
(criticizing an authorwho "tendsto take women's culture at face value as an eternally true natural
force connected to women's biological and culturalrole in nurturance").
108. Dominance feminists focus particularly on rape, pornography, harassment, and
reproductivefreedom, areas where inequality arises out of men's treatmentof women's bodies. See
Lisa R. Pruitt,A Survey of Feminist Jurisprudence, U. ARK.LITTLEROCKL.J. 183, 198 (1994)
(explaining focus of MacKinnon'stheory on legal contexts such as obscenity, rape, and reproductive
freedom). Influenced by Marxism,dominance feminists also focus on economic differences, noting
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Both strandsof feminismalso questionthe notion of "objective"
rules.1" So-calledobjectiverulespromotea malearchetypeand demote
womento the positionof an irrationalother."' Feministsrejectthe notion of "objectivity" because it assumes the existence of unsituated
knowledge. Differencefeminismidentifiesunsituatedknowledge with
male relationalstyles,while dominancefeminismidentifiesthe concept
with malepower. Nevertheless,botharguethatthe law's traditionalreliance on the objectivityand neutralityof legal rulescloaks the oppression of women."' They argue that any attemptto identify neutral
realityor objectivetruthis fruitless,andthatthe assumptionsunderlying
the goals of objectivityand neutralityare not only unfounded,but inevitablyreflectgenderpowerdifferences."2
The feminist critiqueof neutralityand objectivityis particularly
importantfor a discussionof evidencelaw,because evidence law rests
that women's lack of politicalpower reflects their dependenteconomicstatus. See generally
Marxistperspective
to dominance
supranote 105,at48-49(analogizing
feminism).
MACKINNON,
109. Thistendencyto believe thatthereexistsan objectiverealityis certainlynot uniqueto
evidencelaw. As LeslieBenderwrites,"Western
cultureteachesus thatthe patriarchal
description
of realityis notbiasedbutneutral;thatour knowledgeandtruthsare not subjective,intersubjective,
relative, or constructedfrom narrow perspectives but objective, scientifically based and
universal. . . ." (footnote omitted). Bender,supra note 86, at 9.

110. See, e.g., Williams,supranote 100, at 72-74 (notingthatCartesianepistemologyequates
knowledgewith masculinityand the "thingknown"-the objectof knowledge-withfemininity).
Althougha critiqueof neutralprinciplesseemsold-hatwithintheacademy,it has not filteredits way
intothe understanding
or practiceof evidencelaw. Triallawyersmayplanstrategiesaboutwhether
it is betterto have a womanas a juroror a man as an expertwitness,but advocateshave not
of the rulesthemselves.Evidencelaw tendsto be very practical,
generallyquestionedthe neutrality
whichexplainsin partwhyuntilveryrecentlyso littleof the current,very theoretical,jurisprudential
debatehas influencedthinkingaboutevidence. See generallyMichaelL. Seigel, A Pragmatic
Critiqueof ModernEvidenceScholarship,88 Nw. U. L. REV.995 (1994).

111. Feministepistemology
offers aid to anyonechallengingthe notionsof "neutral"
evidence
rules. As ProfessorSusanWilliamsexplains,however,feministscannotbe satisfiedwith merely
and indeterminacy
of neutralrules. See Williams,supranote 100, at 83
provingthe subjectivity
the
(notingthatsocialconstructionism
maythreatenwomen'spoliticalorganizingby "decentering"
Handin handwith its
conceptof "woman"and focusingon critiqueratherthantransformation).
of women,or indeed
critiqueof neutralprinciples,feminismoperatesfromtheaxiomthatoppression
of anyunjustlysubjugated
oppressedgroup,is a socialevil. See generallyid. Socialconstructionism
and post-modernism,
as well as certaincommunitarian
that
theories,also challengethe assumption
one can shedone's particularistic
self andsomehowengagepurelogic to discover"thetruth."See
id. at 69 (notingthesocialconstructionist
argumentthat"thereare no 'brutefacts' to whichhuman
of theirculturallycontingentconceptualcategories"). Feminism,
beingshave access independent
however,addsuniqueelementsin criticizingpurportedly
neutralrules, because feministscannot
adhere to the nihilisticunbridledrelativismthatsome othercritiquesof Cartesianismgenerate.
Feministepistemologyfocuseson a particular
excludedgroup:women.Feminismcannottolerateall
as equallylegitimate,orelse it wouldhave to toleratethe subjugation
of womenas one
approaches
has written,"feminismneitherclaimsuniversality
legitimateoption. As CatherineMacKinnon
nor,
failingthat,reducesto relativity."CatherineA. MacKinnon,
Feminism,Marxism,Methodand the
LEGALTHEORY,
State, in FEMINIST
supra note 88, at 183.
112. See, e.g., MarthaAlbertsonFineman,Feminist Theory in Law: The Difference It Makes, 2

COLUM.
J. GENDER
& L. 1, 12 (1992)("Neutral
treatment
in a genderedworldor withina gendered
institutiondoesnotoperatein a neutralmanner.").
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upon an unspokenassumptionthatneutralrules and objectivetruthexist, andare accessibleto the reasoningthinkerwho ignoresemotion and
other distractions."3In applyingfeministtheoryto evidencelaw, ProfessorKit Kinportshas noted thatthe relianceon logic and experience
in evidencelaw presupposesa neutralvantagepoint and universalidentity of experience.u4 Kinportscites the rules of relevance,which,according to the advisory notes, avowedly rely on "logic" and
"experience,"as one exampleof evidencelaw's faith in its own objectivity."'5Withoutquestioningor even noticing any of the underlying
culturalassumptions,the rulesof evidenceimplythat a social consensus
exists aboutissues of logic and causation,and thatmembersof society
sharelargelysimilarexperiences.
Even modem interdisciplinary
evidence scholarshipis subject to
this critique. Althoughevidencescholarshave been slow to learnfrom
other disciplines,"6
one key areain which interdisciplinaryscholarship
113. Evidencescholarshiphas been criticizedfor perpetuating
the fictionof neutralityand
See WILLIAMTWINING,RETHINKING
assuming the rationality of factfinders.
EVIDENCE:EXPLORATORY
ESSAYS
71-77 (1990) (discussing the optimism in evidence law about the

rationalityof the judicialprocess). Twininghas opinedthatevidence scholarshipis generally
"remarkablyunsceptical in respect of its basic assumptions." Id. See generally WILLIAMTWINING,
THEORIES OF EVIDENCE:

BENTHAM

AND WIGMORE

(1985)

[hereinafter

TWINING,

THEORIES OF

EVIDENCE].As RosemaryHunterexplains,

[T]herulesof evidenceclearlyembodyEnlightenment
epistemology.Theyprivilegefact
over value,reason over emotion,presenceover absence,physicalover psychological,
perceptionover intuition.They are partof the same discursiveregime of hierarchized
dualismsthatimpartsgreaterculturalvalueto the masculinethanto the feminine,partly
throughthe associationof "masculine"with attributessuch as reason, presence, and
andof "feminine"
withemotion,absence,andintuition.
perception
Hunter,supranote2, at 129-30(footnotesomitted);see also Stewartsupranote 16, at 8 (evidence
law reflects"morethana smalltouchof a highlyrationalistic
viewof man").
114. See Kinports,supranote 2, at 431 (quotingMarthaMinow and notingthat although
neutral,relevanceof evidenceis "intheeye of thebeholder").
apparently
115 Id. TheFederalRulesof Evidencedeemevidencerelevantif it has"anytendencyto make
theexistenceof anyfactthatis of consequence
to the determination
of the actionmoreprobableor
less probablethanit wouldbe withouttheevidence."FED.R. EVID.401. Thisrelevancestandardis
explainedin the advisorycommittee'snotes directingjudges to rely on "principlesevolved by
experienceor science, appliedlogicallyto the situationat hand." FEDR. EvID.401 advisory
committee'snote.
116.

See William Twining, The Rationalist Traditionof Evidence Scholarship, in WELLAND

TRULY TRIED: ESSAYSON EVIDENCEIN HONOUROF SIR RICHARDEGGLESTON211 (Enid Campbell

& LouisWallereds., 1982)(notinga revivalof interestby evidence scholarsin interdisciplinary
wherepreviouslythestudyof evidencehasbeenin "isolation");
scholarship
RogerC. Park,Evidence
Scholarship, Old and New, 75 MINN.L. REV.849, 849 (1991) ("The best-known interdisciplinary

movementshave,however,hadlittle or no influenceon evidencescholarship.");
Seigel,supranote
110,at 995 (arguingthat"themajorintellectualmovementscharacterizing
legal thoughtduringthe
latter quarterof the twentiethcentury-includingcritical legal studies.. and practicallegal
studies.. .-have left evidencescholarship
virtuallyuntouched").
Recently,however,scholarshave
begunexpandingthe very narrowand rule-basedevidence scholarship.See JudyCornett,The
Treacheryof Perception: Evidence and Experiencein Clarissa, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 165, 168 (1994)

(examiningthe evidentiaryissues raised in Samuel Richardson'snovel, Clarissa,from an
of pragmatism
to critique
interdisiplinary
perspective);
Seigel,supranote110(utilizingthephilosophy
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has flourished is the "new evidence" movement, which uses Bayesian
probability theory to analyze questions of inference, proof, and the admissibility of hearsay."7 Like older evidence scholarship,however, these
probabilistic models invite a feminist critique because they reinforce
ratherthan underminethe detached, "objective"view of evidence. The
emphasis on quantification and abstractmathematical models devalues
the human aspects of discernment, including judgment, experience, and
intuition."8 Not surprisingly, the new evidence movement has been
criticized as conflicting with feminist methods and principles."19
B. "He Said, She Said"-Toward a Feminist
Critiqueof the Hearsay Rule
Although this Article focuses on a feminist critique of an exception
to the hearsay rule, it will briefly discuss possible avenues of feminist
critique of hearsay as a whole. This analysis invites further thought and
comment, but also serves as a precursor to the feminist critique of the
excited utterance exception. To understand the significance of the exception, it is imperativethat we analyze the rule from which it deviates.
By scanning hearsay law for a bias against the ethic of care, a feminist analysis could examine how the hearsay rule subverts relationships
in and out of the courtroom. A feminist critique could also challenge
the underlying rationale, construction, and application of the hearsay
rule, highlighting its rigidity and its failure to account for cultural and
gender bias. By probing for ways in which women's experiences and
voices are ignored, a feminist critique could challenge the wisdom and
the neutrality of the hearsay rule.
First, regardingits effects on relationships,the hearsay rule can be
criticized for reinforcing unequal relationships and disempowering ordinary citizens. In contrastto an ethic of care, the hierarchicalnature of
the rule separatesattorneysfrom clients, and divides courtroom officers
from jurors. The hearsay rule-the secret handshake of the legal proevidence scholarship);Wellborn, supra note 12 (summarizingsocial science materials, particuarly
from psychology, and suggesting appropriatelegal responses).
117. See RichardLempert,The New Evidence Scholarship:Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66
B.U. L. REV. 439, 441 (1986); Peter Tillers, Intellectual History, Probability, and the Law of
Evidence, 91 MICH.L. REV.1465, 1465-66 (1993) (reviewing SHAPIRO,
supra note 1).
118. This criticism does not advocate that evidence should abandon modem science to help
establish facts. Rather,it raises the concern that the mathematicalformulas and logical proofs that
allegedly model and predict reliability could supplant,rather than describe, the human elements of
decision-making.
119. See generally Symposium,Decision and Influence in Litigation,13 CARDOzoL. REV.253
(1991); L.H. LaRue, Stories VersusTheoriesat the CardozoEvidence Conference: It's Just Another
L. REV. 121, 121-23 (1992) (noting that probabilistictheories have
Metaphorto Me, 14 CARDOZO
been criticized as overly theoretical,acontextual,and non-representativeof how jurors (or any one
else, for that matter)make decisions).
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fession-mystifies lay people and servesto "alienat[e] them from the
trial process."120It perpetuatesthe powerof a professionalelite whose
knowledgeof its arcanerulesmakeslawyersindispensable,if incomprehensible.121The hearsayrule,therefore,impedesconnectionor understanding.It servesto reinforcehierarchyand to perpetuaterelianceon
courtroomprofessionals,who tendto be predominantly
male.122
Because the hearsayrule divides the jury from the actors in the
know,thejudge,the parties,andthe witnessesall possessmore information thanthey may revealto thejury. As noted above,the hearsayrule
restson the assumptionthatformal,in-court,sworntestimonysubjected
to cross-examination
is moretrustworthy
thanout-of-courtstatements.123
trustworthiness
is
not
the
Although
only justificationfor prohibiting
and
based
on
the
social value and politicalright to
hearsay,
arguments
confrontationand cross-examinationabound,'"2
the primaryargument
120. Kinports,supra note 2, at 425; see id. at 423-25 (discussingthe complexity of evidence law
in general and noting the "baffl[ing]"question of defining hearsay).
121. Lawyers who have learned the intricatematrixof the hearsay rules have little incentive to
alter the system or reduce its mystique. See Ronald J. Allen, Commentary:A Response to Professor
Friedman: The Evolutionof the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission,76 MINN.L. REV.797, 801-02
(1992) (discussing the "potentiallyscandalousjustification"for maintainingthe hearsay rule-that it
"protects the competitive advantage of those who know it"); Nance, supra note 9, at 284 n.274
(discussing the "real reasons for the Hearsay" Rule, including the "intellectual investment and a
valuably exclusive expertise" of trial lawyers (quoting Hart & McNaughton,Evidence and Inference
in the Law, in EVIDENCE
AND INFERENCE
56 (D. Lerner ed., 1959))); Stewart, supra note 16, at 2
(noting the rejection of the Model Code of Evidence, which virtuallyabandonedthe hearsay rule).
122. According to the American Bar Association, of 896,000 licensed lawyers in 1994, 23%
were

women.

See

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON WOMEN

IN THE PROFESSION,

WOMENIN THELAW: A LOOKAT THENUMBERS
3, 29, 54 (1995). Although there has been a
noticeable increase in female judges, as of 1991 only 9% of all judges were female. See id. at 29, 51.
For other statistics on women in the legal profession,see Shirley S. Abrahamson,Towarda Courtroom
of One's Own: An Appellate CourtJudge Looks at Gender Bias, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1209, 1216
(noting that there is only one woman on the governing board of the National Board of Trial
Advocates, that "only two percentof the lawyers certified by NBTA were women," and that of the
52 lawyers certified in Wisconsin, none were women); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Symposium: The
Future of the Legal Profession: Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the
Economics, Diversificationand Organizationof Lawyering,44 CASEW. RES.L. REV.621, 652 n.150
(1994) (noting that women are disproportionatelyunderrepresented in bar leadership positions);
Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV.39, 58 ("Women account
for close to forty-five percent of new entrants to the profession, and over twenty percent of all
lawyers, but only about eleven percentof the partnersin the nation's 250 largest firms, eight percent
of the federal bench, sixteen percent of the full professors in law schools, and seven percent of the
law school deans.") (citations omitted). Although women make up approximately 40% of all
MAKING
managers, women hold only 5-7% of senior executive positions. See GOODFORBUSINESS:
FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL: FACT FINDING REPORT OF THE FEDERAL GLASS
CEILINGCOMMISSION151 (Mar. 16, 1995), quotedin Kingsley R. Browne, Sex and Temperamentin

ModernSociety: A Darwinian Viewof the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ.L. REV.971,
977 n.21 (1995).
123. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanyingtext.
124. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, ConstitutionalDimensionsof Hearsay Reform:Towarda ThreeDimensional ConfrontationClause, 76 MINN. L. REV. 623, 626 (1992) (suggesting that societal
dimension of confrontationclause should be given more weight by courts).
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against hearsayevidence rests upon the assumptionthat it is dangerously unreliable.The hearsayrule functionsas a screeningmechanism
for jurors who are presumedto be unwillingor unable to weigh the
trustworthinessof information appropriately.'25 In this way, hearsay
demonstrates deep disrespect for the jurors' intelligence and common
sense.126

Second, the hearsay rule can be criticized for its complexity, rigidlack of reliance on context. Aside from the residual or "catchand
ity,
all" exceptions, 27the hearsay exceptions operate in rigid, highly formalistic categories:'28 excited utterance, state of mind, recorded recollection, business records, dying declaration,and so forth.29 In practical
terms, the hearsay rule and its many exceptions present an all-ornothing choice. The out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth
of the matter asserted must conform to an exception or will be excluded,
even if the statement is highly probative, seems trustworthy given the
surrounding circumstances, and sheds unique light on the case. Conversely, if the hearsay statementfits within an exception, the evidence is
admissible, no matter how untrustworthythe statement may appear.'03
Although the parameters of the hearsay exceptions have been drawn
with reliability in mind, they leave little room for arguing in a specific
case that the evidence is in fact reliable.131 The organizationof the hearsay rule and its exceptions restrictsanalysis of statementsin context and
instead may admit untrustworthyevidence just because it happens to fit

125. But cf Cornett,supra note 116, at 181-182 (noting that depriving an individualof multiple
sources of informationrenderedthe individual'sjudgment unreliable).
126. Although the criticism that hearsayignores common sense is certainlynot new, the focus on
relationshipsas part of practical reason is a unique contributionof feminism. As discussed below,
jurors may not be ideal factfinders, but there is no reason to believe judges, who are still
predominatelyprivileged males, are any better.
127. See FED. R. EVID.803(24), 804(b)(5).
128. For a benign view of the category approach, see Terree E. Foster, Present Sense
Impressions: An Analysis and a Proposal, Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 301 (1979) (explaining that
"exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay have been carved for categories of statementswhich, as a
class, neutralizeone or more of the risks associated with unprobedtestimony").
129. See FED. R. EVID.803.
130. See Eleanor Swift, A FoundationFact Approach to Hearsay, 75 CALIF.L. REV. 1339,
1347-54 (1987) (criticizing the categorical approach). Of course the hearsay ban is only one hurdle
within the framework of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Although an evidentiary fact may be
admissible under the hearsay rule or qualify under one of the exceptions, the trial court may
ultimately exclude the evidence under Rule 403. Under Rule 403, the trier of fact may exclude
relevant evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice,confusion of the issues, or misleadingthe jury, or by considerationsof undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentationof cumulativeevidence." FED.R. EvID. 403.
131. Only the residuals,statementsagainst interest(in criminaltrials) and the business and public
records exceptions provide an independent screen for trustworthiness. See FED. R. EvID. 803(6),
803(8), 804(3). Elsewhere, Judge Becker and I have argued that all hearsay should be subjected to
trustworthinessanalysis. See Becker & Orenstein,supra note 42, at 906-09.
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withina categoricalexception. Such obstructionand rigid acontextual
categoriesare inimicalto the femininevoice.'32
Third,on a substantivelevel, a feministmethod can questionthe
hearsayrulefor its resultingloss of informationand silencingof voices
outsidethe formalcourtroomsetting. Hearsayevidence requiresfactfindersto rely on whatpeoplesaid out of court,and thereforedrawson
jurors'own experience,judgment,and intuitionconcerningthe usefulness of such out-of-courtstatements.As a practicalmatter,the hearsay
rule's screeningfunctionmeansless evidence is availableto the jury.
Less evidence means less informationand context. The hearsay bar
robs jurorsof a traditionaldevice for learningabout the world: hearthe type of evidencebeing lost is particularlyimsay.133Furthermore,
to
women's
traditionalmodes of communicationand hence
portant
relevantto a feministcritique. Much excluded hearsayevidence consists of informalcommunication-gossip,casual statementsto friends,
on-the-scene-observations-asopposed to formal and formalized incourtsworntestimony.
This very type of evidence is crucialto women's oral traditions.
Both differenceand dominancefeministsagree that women are more
likely to develop non-traditional,informal networks of information
(whetherbecauseof difference-basedsocialization,naturalaffinity, or
lack of power). In the same vein, the attainment,dissemination,and
evaluationof such second-handinformationtends to fall within the
132. Professor Eleanor Swift has proposed a contextualized and fact-sensitive approach to
hearsay reform. See Swift, supra note 130. Swift argues that these "categorical exceptions are
substantivegeneralizationsnot formulatedby the trierof fact, but draftedby judges and legislators to
represent their collective beliefs about what kinds of hearsay statements are more likely to be
reliable." Id. at 1351. She highlights the fact that hearsay exceptions, premised on notions of
trustworthinessor some functional equivalent of cross-examination, result in a mechanical and
uncontextualizedapplicationof the exclusion. See id. at 1350-54.
Swift offers an intriguing,if unwieldy, alternative that addresses the problem of hearsay in
functional terms. See id. at 1341. Her foundationfact approach"obligatesthe proponent of hearsay
to produce a foundation witness" who would testify about the circumstances surrounding the
declarant'stestimony, including the declarant's"processof perceiving, remembering, and making a
statementabout a relevant event." Id. at 1342. By providingthis background information,Swift's
proposal bypasses the abstractand rigid categories and instead focuses on the context in which the
statementswere made. With the additionalinformation,jurors can evaluate the hearsay and rely on
common sense means of determiningreliability. Swift's approachhas been lauded as innovative and
refreshing. See Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L. REv. 367, 402 (1992) (referring to Swift's proposal as "striking and
original"). Swift's focus on context and her disavowal of abstract provisions in favor of contextual
knowledge and informedpracticaldecision making is feminist in approach,if not in name.
133. See infra PartIII.C. As McCormick notes, "[m]uch of our learning comes in the form of
hearsay." McCormick, supra note 7, ? 245, at 428. In a philosophical sense, all information is
acquired through hearsay because to evaluate any piece of evidence, we must rely on statements
made by parentsand teachers who helped us understandthe world around us. In fact, banning this
type of hearsay learningwould be "epistemologicallysuicidal." Mary Morton,The Hearsay Rule and
EpistemologicalSuicide, 74 GEo. L. J. 1301, 1305 (1986).
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practicalexperiencesof women. Informalout-of-courtstatementsare
arguablymoretypicalof women'sdifferentvoice. Historically,women
were deprivedof political information,newspapers,and even literacy,
and instead developed more informal methods, such as gossip and word
of mouth, to learn about their worlds.T" To survive, women had to develop acute sensitivity to the moods and meanings of the people around
them, and interpretevents second-hand.3""Yet, such analytic tools are
underutilized in a formal courtroom atmosphere, where the bar against
hearsay controls. The hearsay prohibition, therefore, sacrifices potentially useful information packaged in a form familiar to and comfortable for women.
C. Considering the Rights of CriminalDefendants
Feminist arguments against hearsay are intriguing, yet they pose
many difficult problems of practical application and theoretical consistency. A solution to the problems posed by the hearsay rule seems elusive, particularly in criminal cases, where the cumbersome, formal
requirements are designed, in part, to protect criminal defendants.'36
Certainly the hearsay rule would benefit from less jargon and a simpler
structure. The feminist critique of hearsay outlined above, however,
seems to demand more dramatic changes, many of which would unfairly disadvantage those accused of crimes.
A feminist call for case-specific determinations of admissibility of
individual hearsay statements would be unfair to criminal defendants,
134. See DeborahJones, Gossip: Notes on Women's Oral Culture,3 WOMEN'S STUD.INT'L Q.
193, 194 (1980) (defining gossip as an intimatepersonalstyle of discourse among women that serves
in partas an informalcommunicationnetwork);id. at 197 ("Gossip is a staple of women's lives and
the study of gossip is the study of women's concerns and values, a key to female subculture.");cf
Bernard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality,Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of
American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO
L. REV. 229, 349-50 (1994) (comparing the traditional
white Protestantmale emphasis on visual imagerywith the aural metaphorsand traditionsof (among
others) women, African-Americans, and Jews, and noting the importance of "voice," hearing, and
story to critical legal scholars). Certainly men gossip too, and less powerful people engage
disproportionatelyin such informal methods of communication. See id. ("Compared to men,
American women as a group have historically shared a greater proportion of their knowledge,
experiences, and thoughts with one another by talking and listening, telling stories, and engaging in
the intimate, detailed dialogue that men have pejoratively called 'gossip."') (citations omitted). But,
as the heroine, Anne Elliot, proclaimsin Jane Austen's Persuasion, "Menhave had every advantage
of us in telling their own story. Education has been theirs in so much higher a degree .... " JANE
230 (Zodiac Press 1960) (1818).
AUSTEN,PERSUASION
135. For example, in an analysis of Samuel Richardson's novel Clarissa, Judy Cornett evaluates
the heroine's ability to draw sound inferences and organize the evidence available to her. Professor
Cornettobserves that Clarissapresented a counter-example to the rational and formalistic evidence
theories of her day that opposed hearsay: "For Clarissa and Anna, whose freedom of movement is
limited by social convention, hearsayis an importantsource of information." Cornett,supra note 116,
at 181.
136. See Park, supra note 9, at 54 (distinguishingthe problems posed by hearsay in civil and
criminal trials).
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who need some way of predictingand preparingfor the evidenceused
againstthem. The less powerfulcriminaldefendantsare,the less likely
they will be able to refute hearsay. Similarly, criminal defendants who
come from disadvantagedcircumstanceswill be less able to marshal the
resources to collect or generate extensive hearsay testimony of their

own, so a relaxedhearsayrulewill favorthe prosecution.
Although some feminists have occasionally joined forces with lawand-order advocates (for instance, in arguing for less defendantprotective evidence rules in cases of rape and other sexual violence),137
by and large feminists express empathy and concern for the rights of
criminal defendants.138Like women, criminal defendants as a class are
often disadvantaged in their relationship to the legal establishment and
frequently remain unheard in the courtroom. Feminists, who champion
empathy and connectedness, may logically conclude that they must extend that same ethic of care to criminal defendants.139 Feminist insight
drawn from the experience of subjugationand difference applies, therefore, to disadvantagedgroups, such as the poor and African Americans,
who are disproportionatelyrepresentedamong the accused.
Additionally, one might argue that the hearsay rule itself, which in
criminal cases derives in part from the right to confront witnesses, reflects an appreciation for connectedness. According to confrontation
theory, defendants have a right to look their accusers in the eye. Although this right is largely adversarial,it also representsan intense social
connection between two people'14 (as opposed to the trial by affidavit
that served as the original impetus for the right to confrontation).'41
137. Feminists have even joined with the fundamentalistChristianRight to oppose pornography.
See generally CatharineA. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech, 20 HARV.C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 1 (1985).
138. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Empathy,Narrative and VictimImpact Statements,63 U. CHI. L
REV. 361, 365, 386 (1996) (noting that emotion and storytelling can serve non-feminist ends and
arguing that despite the value currentlyplaced on empathy and narrative, victims' statements should
be suppressed because they "evoke emotions inappropriatein the context of criminal sentencing");
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN.L. REV. 937 (1985) (discussing
problems regardingmovement in favor of victim's rights).
139. There is a respectable argument to the contrary concerning crimes against women;
however, as much as feminists can object to the solicitude that men accused of crimes against women
often receive, feminists cannotjettison the presumptionof innocence.
140. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (imagining a
scenario where a father accused of child abuse cannot "sit in the presence of the child, and ... ask,
personally or throughcounsel, 'it is really not true, is it, that I-your father(or mother)whom you see
before you-did these terriblethings?"').
141. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361 (1992) (discussing the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh,
who was accused of treason, based primarilyupon the confession of a co-conspirator that was likely
obtained through torture); see also JOHN GEORGE PHILLMORE, HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 157-68 (1850).
See generally Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of
Confrontationand the Hearsay Rule: Sir WalterRaleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM.L. BULL.99
(1972).
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In sum, a feministcritiqueof the hearsayrule providesreason to
distrustthe hearsayrule and, of course,insightinto courtroomdynamics. However, given the countervailingconcerns of criminal defendants,
feminists probably should not argue for wholesale change of the hearsay rule protections. More promising, from a practical perspective, is
the feminist critique of the excited utterance exception in the next Part.
In addition to offering theoretical challenges and cultural insights, the
critique also suggests practicalchanges in the excited utterance doctrine
that can be achieved without undue hardshipon criminal defendants.
IV
THATSAMEOLDVOICEISYELLING
AGAIN:A FEMINIST
CRITIQUE OF THE EXCITED UTTERANCE

The characterizationof a statement as an excited utterance reflects
social milieus and highlights political tensions; what is considered
"exciting" is constantly changing. Perhaps what society finds exciting

or startlingas a cultureis partof whatdistinguishesa particularage. In
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many cases involved
excited utterancesmade by railroad employees about the cause of railway accidents.'42 In more recent cases, gun crimes, automobile accidents, and emergency 911 calls figure prominently.'43 Throughout the
history of the doctrine, rape and other sexual violence, woman-battering,
and child abuse examples arise repeatedly.'44
This Part employs a feminist method to challenge the wisdom and
fairness of the excited utterance exception, exposing some of the basic
but hidden assumptionsconcerning how we, as a society, amass evidence
and judge credibility, especially in cases of sexual assault. A feminist
142. In part,this was because under the agency law of the day that influenced evidence law,
railway workers were not able to make admissions on behalf of their employers. See, e.g., Vicksburg
& MeridianR.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99, 106 (1886) (considering statement describing conversation
with engineer after train accident); Walters v. Spokane Int'l Ry. Co., 108 P. 593 (Wash. 1910)
(evaluating statementby railway conductorregardingtrain derailment).
143. On incidents involving guns, see, e.g., United States v. Sewell, 88 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir.
1996) (evaluating excited utterancemade while declarant saw carjacker put gun to victim's head);
People v. Guam, 69 F.3d 369 (9th Cir. 1995) (evaluating excited utterance made minutes after gun
pointed at declarant's head). For cases involving auto accidents, see, e.g., Tackett v. State, 670
S.W.2d 824 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (holding excited utterance by accident victim who later died
admissible for proving manslaughterand leaving scene of accident); Lovato v. Herrman, 685 P.2d
240, 241 (Colo. 1984) (holding rearend collision "qualifiesas 'startlingevent"'). On 911 calls, see,
e.g., Admissibilityof Tape-Recordingor Transcriptof "911" EmergencyTelephone Calls, 3 A.L.R.5th
784; cases include State v. Guizzotti,803 P.2d 808 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
144. Professors Mueller and Kirkpatick have noted the special relationship between excited
utterancesand victim's statements. "[T]he startlingevent is often an accident or violent crime that
injures or claims the life of the speaker: Often he was in the best position to see and report, and
excluding his statement would mean doing without good evidence and would have the unattractive
& KIRKPATRICK, supra note 24, ?
consequence of shuttingout the cries of the victim." MUELLER
8.35, at 1217.
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method raises many questions about the excited utterance exception: Why does the law assumethat everyone manifestsstress in the
same way? Who is likely to report immediately? Why do some people
delay? Why is such delay assumed to be evidence of lying? Who is described by the excited utteranceconception of stress? Who is excluded?
Finally, what explains the longevity of the doctrine, particularly in light
of the powerful psychological critique that diminished perception may
render excited utterancesless trustworthy?
A. The Myth of Universal Experience
The excited utteranceexception allows certain excited statements to
be admitted as substantive evidence and elevates these out-of-court
statements to the status of competent evidence. It thereby implicitly
deems such statementsand, arguably,those who utteredthem, more reliable. As a logical matter,the exception also denigrates statementsoutside its purview, deeming such statements,and the speakers who made
them, insufficiently trustworthy. The doctrine therefore favors spontaneous, visibly agitated speakers over other more quiescent, reflective,
frozen, or passive ones. By privileging immediate, excited cries, the excited utterance contributes, albeit subtly, to our cultural and legal definition of credibility.'45
Wigmore's own justification of the excited utterance exception
provides a good starting point for a feminist critique of the doctrine.'46
Wigmore rationalizedthe excited utterance rule as grounded in experience. He argued that the excited utterance "is based on our experience
145. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in CriminalLaw, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
2151 (1995) (noting general tendency of criminal law to favor male concerns and male
perspectives). Schulhofer critiques the radical feminist view that "even-handed inaction is
nonetheless an affirmativepolicy that contributesto the subordinationof women." Id. at 2161.
146. Interestingly, Wigmore, the chief proponent of the excited utterance exception, was
adamantin his suspicion of women. In his treatise, Wigmore advocated that the court should delve
into the mental health of all female complainants in rape cases. Wigmore was convinced that
"female types of excessive or perverted sexuality" would dream up "imaginary sex incidents of
which the narratoris the heroine or the victim." 3A Wigmore,supra note 11, ? 924a. He expressed
concern for the "real victim," that is to say, the "innocent man." Id. Unsurprisingly,this view of
survivors of rape and other sexual violence has prompted feminist comment. Although these
assertions need no refutation, it is interestingto note that Wigmore relied on very scanty data to
support his conclusions. See generally Leigh B. Bienen, A Question of Credibility:John Henry
Wigmore's Use of Scientific Authorityin Section 924a of the Treatise on Evidence, 19 CAL. W. L
REV.235 (1983).
Wigmore's misogyny also influenced the developmentof excited utterance on a doctrinal level.
Wigmore advocated strongly for additionalprotections on the defendant's behalf when the excited
utterance exception arose in rape cases. He was particularly concerned about cases of
"bootstrapping,"situationsin which the evidence of the rape (a necessary preliminaryto establish
stress) was proven in part through the excited utterance itself. See 6 WIGMORE,
supra note 11,
? 1761. Because Wigmore distrustedwomen's rape reports, he warned against allowing the excited
statementitself to prove the preliminaryfactorof an exciting event. See id.
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that, under certain external circumstances" the "stress of nervous excitement... stills the reflective faculties. ....'"" But upon whose experience did Wigmore rely? He relied primarily on case authority (of
dubious persuasiveness)148to demonstrate that the excited utterance
doctrine possessed a venerable common law pedigree. To explain the
doctrine's logic and policy, however, Wigmore appealed to unidentified
"experience," which he assumed everyone shared.a49Without reflection
or examination, Wigmore supposed that all people react to stress in the
same way and that the excited utterance exception accurately describes
that universal reaction.'5o
A feminist analysis questions the various unproved and unthinking
assumptions embedded in the doctrine, demonstrating that the excited
utterance exception does not, and indeed cannot, rest on "universal"
experience. Although, as noted in Part II.C, the excited utterance exception has been criticized for its failure to account for speakers' diminished perception and memory when under stress, there has been
little challenge to the rule's basic assumptionsabout how stress is manifested. Underlying the excited utterance doctrine is the notion that a
normal person affected by a deeply stressful event would, within a brief
time, utter an agitated statement concerning the event. By probing the
identity of this "normalperson," however, we discover that our fantasy
declarantspeaks with the voice of power and privilege.
B. Rape TraumaSyndromeand a Different Voice
The voice encapsulated by the excited utterance does not reflect
many women's experiences. In particular,the doctrine's implicit cultural assumptions of how "normal" and "reliable" people communicate and react to stress do not comport with the practical experience of
survivors of rape and other sexual violence. Indeed, the actual experience of many survivors could not be more different from the expectations encompassed in the excited utterance. Unlike the picture
147. 6 WIGMORE, supra note 11, ? 1745, at 132-33 (emphasis added) (quoting Keefe v. State, 72
P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1937)).
148. See supra note 32 and accompanyingtext (discussing Wigmore's scholarship and his miscitation and misinterpretationof importantauthority);see also Bienen, supra note 146, at 238 (noting
that Wigmore looked to "academicsources which were never intendedto supportthe propositionshe
put forward").
149. See Peter Tillers, Webs of Thingsin the Mind: A New Science of Evidence, 87 MICH.L
REV.1225, 1226 (1989) (discussing Wigmore's emphasis on the role of experience in determining
relevancy). In supportof the idea of a "universal"experience, Bentham declared that "experience
is the foundation of all our knowledge."

TWINING, THEORIESOF EVIDENCE,supra note 113, at 29.

In a similar vein is Justice Holmes famous dictum, "[T]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience." OLIVER
LAW1 (1881).
WENDELL
HOLMES,
JR., THECOMMON
150. Although it is true that feminism values experience, feminist method debunks the
universalist notion of "experience," recognizing that even within our culture we do not share a
common "experience."
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portrayedby the excited utteranceexception, calling for a prompt utterance from a visibly stressed person, a victim of rape or other sexual
violence is often numb and uncommunicative. Rape Trauma Syndrome
("RTS") describes this experience of many survivors of rape or other
sexual violence who experience systematic withdrawal after the
trauma."'
RTS documents typical behavioral manifestations of survivors of
rape and other sexual violence.'52 Often the survivor initially suffers
disorganization; she may be hysterical or she may be withdrawnand
subdued. The recovery from rape and other sexual violence is a slow
process. As the survivorbeings to reorganize psychologically, she experiences classic signs of post-traumaticstress,usually nightmares, phobias, and sexual fears.'53 Only over time do most survivors process
memories, begin to overcome the psychic numbing, and start talking to
friends and counselors.
Ironically, these unexcited, reflective statements--described by
RTS-that survivors make weeks or months after the trauma are not
admissible under the current evidentiary scheme, even though their
typicality makes them seem particularlytrustworthy."T The excited utterance exception, however, does not include these clinically observed,
delayed, calm statementsbecause of the time lag, as well as the declarant's lack of visible excitement.'55 The rule has the psychology back151. Thetermwas firstcoinedby socialworkersAnnBurgessandLyndaHolmstrom
in 1974.
Ann Burgess& LyndaLytle Holmstrom,
981
Rape TraumaSyndrome,131 AM.J. PSYCHIATRY
(1974). Rape TraumaSyndromewas originallydesignedas a psychologicaltool to help treat
survivorsof rapeandothersexualviolence,anddevelopedas an outgrowthof Post-Traumatic
Stress
Syndrome.

See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI& EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
SCIENTIFICEVIDENCE ?? 9-1

to 9-6 (2d ed. 1993).
152. See LauraEtlinger,Comment,Social Science Researchin DomesticViolenceLaw:A
Use,58 ALB.L. REV.1259,1297(1995)(citingrecentresearchon
Proposalto Focuson Evidentiary
women'sreactionsto rape).
153. See Nicole Rosenberg Economou,Defense Expert Testimonyon Rape Trauma
L.J. 1143, 1145-46(1991);DeborahA.
Syndrome:Implications
for the Stoic Victim,42 HASTINGS
on RapeTraumaSyndrome:An Argument
63
Dwyer, ExpertTestimony
for LimitedAdmissibility,
WASH.L. REV.1063, 1064 (1988).

154. Professors
JohnC. YuilleandPatriciaT. Tollestrup
citea casestudyin whicha womanwho
surviveda sexualassaultwas unableto recall any detailsof the event for monthsafterthe attack,
A
althougheventuallyshewasableto recallmostdetails.SeeJohnC. Yuille& PatriciaT. Tollestrup,
Modelof the DiverseEffectof Emotionon EyewitnessMemory,in THEHANDBOOK
OF EMOTION
ANDMEMORY:
RESEARCH
ANDTHEORY
209 (Sven-AkeChristianson
ed. 1992). There is also
psychologicalevidencethattraumaticeventscan be emblazonedon one's memory,butfor thisto
happen,thesurvivormustfirsthavetimeto processtheinformation.Thiscontroversial
phenomenon
is dubbed"flashbulbmemo[ry]."See Egeth,supranote 82, at 249. The traditional"flashbulb"
questionis "[w]herewereyou whenyou heardthatKennedyhadbeenassassinated?"
Id. Todayone
mightask,"wherewereyou whenO.J.Simpsonwasacquitted?"
155. See,e.g, Peoplev. McConnell,
358 N.W.2d895,896 (Mich.1984)("Thestatementsmade
to herauntsomesevendaysafterthecriminalsexualconductallegedlyoccurred
by thecomplainant
werenot admissibleundertheexcitedutterance
exceptionto the hearsayrulebecausethe statement
didnotrevealtherequisitespontaneity
v. UnitedStates,412 A.2d 1, 9 (D.C. 1980),
...."); Fitzgerald
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wards.'56The rationaleof the excitedutteranceexception rests on the
theorythatsincerityis guaranteed,becausethe declarantdid not delay,
or becauseany brief delay was mitigatedby the stressthat precluded
But in fact,a rapesurvivoris morelikely
fabricationby the declarant.'57
to be calm shortlyafterthe incidentand is more likely to delay reporting the crime.s58
vacated, 443 A.2d 1295 (D.C. 1982) (holding declarationinadmissibleas excited utteranceif it "loses
the character of a spontaneous utterance... and becomes a calm narrative of a past event");
Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 383 A.2d 858, 863 (Pa. 1978) ("[T]he 'excited' nature of the
utteranceseems belied by the calm and unemotionalmannerin which they [sic] were made.").
In State v. Chapin, 826 P.2d 194 (Wash. 1992), the court held that the statement of a male rape
survivordid not qualify under the excited utterance exception. The court determined that he "was
unlikely to have still been in an excited state caused by the alleged rape"when he made the statement
"withina day or so." Id. at 198. Also, earlierin the day, before making the statement,"he had been
calm and had engaged in his usual activities. This increasesthe dangerof fabrication. Consequently,
the requirementof an excited state caused by the startlingevent is not met . . . ." Id.; cf Baber v.
United States, 324 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (weighing the factors creating a "borderline"case
under the exception).
156. The divergence between popular presumptionsof how "normal"people react to trauma
and how women actually do react is even more troublingin light of the value our system places on
demeanor evidence. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 23 (discussing psychological evidence that
witness accuracy does not correlate with confidence); Wellborn, supra note 12, at 1077 (exploring
perceived importance of demeanor evidence). Although our legal culture elevates demeanor
evidence (in fact, one prominentexplanationof the hearsayrule is the factfinder's need to evaluate
demeanor), it turnsout that untrainedobservers such as jurors do no better than chance at detecting
lies or evaluatingthe perceptiveskills of witnesses. See id. at 1080-82. Often those witnesses whom
factfindersbelieve are lying are merely exhibiting signs of stress, such as sweating, eyes darting, and
fidgeting. This is called the "Othelloerror." (Othello killed his wife because he misread her stress
for guilt). Id. at 1080. Worse yet, despite psychological evidence to the contrary, people are
generally confident that they can spot liars. See id. at 1081.
157. In United States v. Sherlock, 865 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1989), one rape survivor "made her
statementapproximatelyone hour after the assault" and the other "made her statement even later."
Id. at 1083. Both had spoken to several persons about the rape. The court explained that the women
"hadtime to think about their actions and to invent an excuse about their late arrival at the dorm with
alcohol on their breath." Id. The court ruled that the hearsaystatementsdid not fall under the scope
of the excited utteranceexception. See id.
158. Dwyer notes that survivors of rape and other sexual violence often delay reporting, and
the delays are longer when the woman knows her assailant. See Dwyer, supra note 153, at 1067 n.24
(citing SEDELLE KATZ & MARY ANN MAZUR, UNDERSTANDING THE RAPE VICTIM: A SYNTHESIS
OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 188-90 (1979) (reviewing several studies indicating that "a substantial

numberof women delay reportingrape, and that the closer the relationshipbetween the victim and
the attackerthe longer the delay)); BarbaraDuffy Stewart et al., The Aftermathof Rape: Profiles of
Immediate and Delayed TreatmentSeekers, 175 J. NERVOUS& MENTALDISEASE90, 92 (1987)
(finding that "amonga sample of highly distressed women who had been raped two months to over
three years before requestinghelp, nearly 73% knew their assailants, as compared with only 50% of
immediate treatment seekers"). Dwyer postulates that feelings of intense fear and helplessness
associated with RTS may be exaggerated when the victim knows that her assailant could find her.
See id.
Courtsoccasionally seem to acknowledgethis truth. As the court explained in State v. Parker,
730 P.2d 921 (Idaho 1986), "A sexual assault is one of the more distressingexperiences a person
could have. The distress is likely to remainbottled up in the victim until she or he can talk about what
happened." Id. at 924. The court concluded: "Given that sexual assault crimes violate one's most
intimatephysical and mental feelings, the victim can reasonablybe expected not to discuss the crime
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Courts debate the appropriate use of RTS evidence and are par-

ticularlyreluctantto allow expertsto testify that a survivorof rape or
other sexual violence suffers from RTS in order to prove that the
woman did not consent.'"59Courts are more willing, however, to allow
RTS evidence to explain delay, recantations,and seemingly normal or
casual activities after the rape or other sexual violence."'6 This debate on
the scope of RTS expert testimony underscoresthe importance of using
the knowledge gained from RTS in more fundamental ways. One essential benefit of RTS research for evidence law stems from the information rule drafterscan learn and apply in devising evidence rules that
reflect the experience of survivors of rape and other sexual violence,
and allow their voices to be heard in the courtroom.
Rape TraumaSyndrome,therefore,serves two essential functions.'6'
From a psychological perspective, RTS assures survivors who experience
until meeting with a family member,close friend, law enforcementagent, or other trustedindividual."
Id. Courtstend to use this understanding,however, to stretchthe time frame of the excited utterance
exception, not to abandonthe constructaltogether.
159. See Hunter,supra note 2, at 147 ("[C]ourtshave been reluctant to permit experts to testify
that a rape complainant suffers from RTS in order to prove nonconsent; such evidence has been
excluded on the groundsthat it is unreliable,prejudicial,or entirely unhelpfulto the jury.").
160. See Etlinger, supra note 152, at 1297-98. As Professor Toni Massaro explains, expert
testimony concerning the syndromecan educate the jury about the nature of rape and how survivors
respond to the traumaticevent. See Toni M. Massaro, Experts, Psychology, Credibility,and Rape:
The Rape TraumaSyndromeIssue and its Implicationfor Expert Psychological Testimony,69 MINN.
L. REv. 395, 432-36 (1985); see also MorrisonTorrey, WhenWill We Be Believed? Rape Myths and
the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions,24 U.C. DAVISL. REV. 1013, 1067 (1991) (advocating
expanded use of concept of expert RTS testimony to permit introduction of expert testimony
concerning falsity of rape myths).
161. Rape Trauma Syndrome has its critics who, with merit, denounce its focus as a medical
model that pathologizes the reasonable reactions of female victims of sexual violence by labeling
their behavior as "symptoms"or "syndromes." See Susan Stefan, The Protection Racket: Rape
TraumaSyndrome, Psychiatric Labeling, and Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1271 (1994) (arguing that
women, who have encountered difficulty in being believed by doctors and psychologists, should be
leery of placing rape in the care of mental health professionals). Stefan makes some excellent
arguments, particularlyin criticizing the medical and social work professions, but she neglects the
overwhelming feeling of relief that survivors feel when they learn that their experience is normal.
Although Stefan is correct that it is inappropriateto transform the observations of RTS into to a
normativerequirement,she undervaluesits benefits. Despite legitimate concerns, RTS nevertheless
can serve as an essential tool for feminists; it should not be abandoned.
Other critics worry about a potential "catch-22": that RTS has merely replaced one set of
expectations of the "proper"way for a survivorof sexual violence to react with another set of rigid
expectations. Women can suffer because they don't fit patriarchalpresumptionsabout victims of
sexual violence, or if they do, then they are suspected of making it all up because they don't fit the
RTS "requirements."See generally Economu, supra note 153, at 1170-71. Cf Myrna Raeder, The
Double Edged Sword: Admissibilityof Syndrome and Profile Evidence By and Against Batterers in
Cases ImplicatingDomestic Violence,67 COLo.L. REV.(forthcoming1996).
Still othersdoubtthe scientific validity of RTS and arguethatit should be used solely for healing
survivors and not for proving guilt or even for vouching for the survivor's reactionas normal. Recent
psychological literature,however, seems to credit RTS as a reliable descriptionof the experiences of
many survivors of rape and other sexual violence. See Patricia A. Frazier & Eugene Borgida, Rape
TraumaSyndrome:A Review of Case Law and Psychological Research, 16 L. & HUM.BEHAV.293,
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withdrawaland numbness that their reactions are normal. From a legal
perspective, RTS can be used to educate the jury and, most importantly
from the perspective of this Article, to inform rule drafters about the
wide range of possible reactions to a sexual assault.
C. Social Expectations of a WrongedWoman
However RTS informs evidence law, we must question why a reaction to stress that is at odds with women's documented experience is
nevertheless venerated by evidence law. Part of the answer lies in the
fact that although the excited utterancedoes not describe the experience
of women who have suffered rape or other sexual violence, it does comport with society's expectations of survivorsof sexual violence. Doctrinally, there are strong indications that the excited utterance exception
functions to promote social norms, articulatingand enforcing social and
cultural expectations of how women should react to these traumatic
events.
Because of its uninformed and unrealistic doctrinal requirements,
the excited utterance doctrine reinforces cultural presumptions about
normalcy that enable society to dismiss women as liars. In requiring an
excited and near-immediateresponse from the victim, evidence law implicitly dismisses those who do not fit the fixed pattern of credibility.
The structureof the rules insinuates that a reaction to a traumatic event
that deviates from this prototype marks the declarant as unnatural,
sneaky, vindictive, or otherwise unreliable. Indeed, the excited utterance
exception is often justified because it purportedly prevents conniving
and vindictiveness.
Studies confirm that survivors of rape and other sexual violence
behave in ways, described by RTS theory, that seem counterintuitiveto
the average juror.162 The initial quietude-the deadly calm that survivors may display-conflicts with the cultural construct of the indignant
respectable woman. As a consequence, survivorsof rape and other sexual violence are often disbelieved because they do not fit the expecta299-300(1992),citedin Etlinger,supranote152,at 1297n.204. Furthermore,
even if the scientific
evidenceis unconvincing
to some,thepatterndescribedby RTSfromanecdotalclinicalobservation
alone providesanotherdifferenttype of "experience"that shouldco-exist alongsideWigmore's
of theexperienceof stress.
expostulation
162. See Stefan,supranote161,at 1340n.365(notingthat"if a rape victimis too calm when
reportingthe assaultto police, defense counsel will questionher veracity or imply that she
consented");Torrey,supranote 160, at 1064-65,1017-31(reviewingpsychologicalliteratureand
summarizing
popularperceptionsof how rape victimsare expectedto behave). Studiesof jury
behaviorand attitudesreveal poorlydisguisedhostilitytowardrape victims,whomjuries view as
assumingtheriskof rape"byconductsuchas drinking,wearing'seductive'clothing,or acceptinga
ridewiththeassailant".StevenBennettWeisburd
& BrianLevin,"OntheBasisof Sex":Recognizing
Gender-BasedBias Crimes,5 STAN.L. & POL'Y.REV.21, 31 (1994) (quoting DEBORAH
L. RHODE,
JUSTICE
ANDGENDER
248 (1989)).
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tion that a sincere woman genuinely wronged would cry out immediately.13
Underlying the notion that an excited cry is inherently credible is
the assumption that a trustworthywoman would issue an immediate distressed cry. This assumption, dating back to Biblical law, distinguished
the credibility of a victim who was raped in the city from one raped in
the country. In the populated city, she would not be believed unless
someone heard her cry out."M The operation of excited utterance mirrors the Biblical standard. Although the contemporary excited utterance exception has no volume requirement, to qualify under the
exception, a survivor of rape or other sexual violence must issue an excited statementvery shortly after the event.
The requirement of prompt reaction and reporting in the Biblical
tradition and the excited utterance requirement are particularly unreasonable in cases involving rape and other sexual violence. Many
women suffer constraints,psychological and practical,that make it unlikely that they will fit the excited utteranceparadigm.Survivors of sexual violence feel shame, face disbelief, and experience a realistic fear of
rejection as "damaged goods."'165 Additional impediments arise from
the historical silencing of women as a class and the notion that victims
of sexual crimes somehow "asked for it," (a mean-spirited conclusion
that only seems to apply to men when they are in prison). Furthermore,
RTS research demonstrates that rape and other sexual violence causes
tremendous internal turmoil and upheaval that lead many women to
withdraw.
One indication that the excited utterance is more about social expectation and control than about psychology (however misguided) is
that courts tend to admit out-of-court statementseven when much time
has passed for reflection, if the victim reported at the first real opportunity.166 In other words, even if the victim already had an opportunity to
163. Survivors of rape and other sexual violence are overwhelminglywomen. Nonetheless, it is
likely that the excited utterancealso misdescribes the experience of men who are victims of sexual
violence. The focus here, however, is on women, because women's welfare is central to feminism,
the RTS evidence on which this Article relies was generated from the experience of women.
Furthermore,all women suffer when an evidence rule serves to discount women's credibility.
164. See Deuteronomy 22:23-27.
165. See Ronet Bachman,U.S. Dep't of Justice, Violence Against Women 9 (1994) (discussing
women's experience of fear and shame leading them to fail to report),cited in Myrna S. Raeder, The
Admissibilityof Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463
(1996).
166. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera,43 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]ime lapse to be
considered in [child sexual abuse] cases is not simply the time between the abuse and the declaration.
Rather, courts must also be cognizant of the child's first real opportunityto report the incident.")
(citing Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 947 (4th Cir. 1988)); State v. Peite, 839 P.2d 1223, 1230
(Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (emphasizingthat "challengedevidence consisted of the very first statements"
made by survivor after the rape, and ruling that these statementswere admissible even though not

1997]

THEEXCITED
UTTERANCE
EXCEPTION

205

calm down and reflect, (hence theoretically vitiating the spontaneity and
assurance of reliability) her declaration is often nevertheless admissible
if she reported the rape or other sexual violence as soon as possible.
This approach echoes the doctrine of prompt complaint'67and elevates
the fact of quick report over stress as a guaranteeof sincerity. It reflects
the high value associated with the woman's "proper" response in conformity with the constructof the believable injured woman and rewards
women for acting in conformity with these social expectations.
D. Denial and Power
The observation that the excited utterance rule excludes reliable
speakers, reinforces social expectations about how women should react
to rape and other sexual violence, and fuels society's inclination to dismiss women as liars, builds upon a growing body of scholarship concerning women's experiences in the courtroom. In a recent article,
Professor Kim Lane Scheppele explores how legal or courtroom
"truth" is constructed by society to discount the voices of some
women.168 Scheppele focuses on what she terms the "womanof courts in assessing evidence, examining why the
unfriendly habits"'169
"stories women tell in court, particularlyin cases of sexualized violence
like rape, sexual harassment,incest, and woman battering,are vulnerable
to attack as unbelievable."•70 She observes that abused and harassed
made immediately after the event); cf McGuganv. State, 167 P.2d 76, 79 (Okla. Crim. App. 1946)
(determiningvictim's failureto complain to driver who picked her up on highway and drove her to
police station barredadmission of victim's latercomplaintto police).
Althoughthis willingness to extend the durationof excitement to fit within the excited utterance
exception could merely reflect a doctrinal confusion with the doctrine of promptcomplaint, which
was admissibleto shore up the "prosecutrix's"testimony in a rape case, it more likely reflects the
deeper culturalassumptioncommon to both doctrines that women, if they aren't liars, will report as
soon as possible. See Ellis v. State, 6 So. 768, 770 (Fla. 1889) ("The female outragedshould seek the
first opportunityto complain, and the fact that she does complaingoes to the jury as evidence ... ").
167. See infra note 213.
168. Kim Lane Scheppele, Just The Facts, Ma'am: Sexualized Violence, EvidentiaryHabits, and
the Revisionof Truth,37 N.Y.L. SCH.L. REV.123 (1992). The title of the piece refers to the image of
Sergeant Joe Friday from the old Dragnet television show--enjoining a hysterical woman to rid
herself of emotion and describe a story chronologically and dispassionately, sticking to "just the
facts."
169. Id. at 125. Professor Scheppele argues that even though the law "pretends to be above
politics, prejudice,and partiality,"it affects women unfairly. Id. at 166. In particular,she targets the
"preferencefor first versions of stories," which "looks like a neutralrule" but "falls particularlyhard
on women." Id. at 169. She argues that it is a common phenomenon among women recounting a
traumaticstory for the truthto develop over time, particularlyas the women consider and reinterpret
events. A woman will recover significant memory gaps as she gets stronger. Women who have been
subject to sexual violence also exhibit symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome which
"shatter[s]... their sense of narrative coherence." Id. at 138-39 (citation omitted). On a more
philosophical plane, Scheppele notes that disbelief of revised stories also indicates our judicial
approachto truthas "singular,immediately apparent,and permanent."Id. at 127.
170. Id. at 123.
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women exhibit many of the characteristicstraditionally associated with

liars-they remainsilentfor a long time afterthe abuse,procrastinatein
reporting the incident, hesitate, change their stories, or sound equivocal
because of self-blame.171Scheppele uses the Anita Hill-ClarenceThomas
hearings to demonstratehow delay in reportinghurts women's credibility.'• The senators,and even Thomas himself, relied on Hill's delay to
question her memory, perception, and motives.
It is illuminating to speculate why courts often see what psychologists identify as women's typical reactions to stress and violence as evidence of lying. Two related theories offer possible explanations. First,
as Scheppele suggests, the cultural construct of the lying, scheming female may be rooted in the psychological defense mechanism of denial."73In psychoanalytic terms, denial is a way for the ego to repress
painful facts and thoughts,174crowd them out of consciousness, and
avoid facing them.'75 Denial can happen on an individual level (such as
an alcoholic who denies having a drinking problem) or can affect an
entire society (such as German villagers who claimed to be unaware of
Nazi genocide in nearby concentrationcamps).176
171. See id. at 126-27.
172.
As Scheppele notes, there are many explanationsfor delay in reporting and changes in a
story. Delay may arise from an attemptto solve, defuse, or negotiate a problem. See id. at 149.
Once a sexually harassed woman has been fired, she has no further incentive for silence. Her
"delayed"disclosure is not necessarily promptedby revenge, but by the fact that she has nothing left
to lose. The issue of the subtle (and not so subtle) expectations we have of how women react to
stressful situations has been played out in battered woman syndrome as well. See generally
Mahoney, supra note 5 (comparingthe argumentsmade for disbelieving Hill with traditionalways of
discreditingwomen who stay in abusive relationships). Professor Mahoney draws on the rhetoric of
the Clarence Thomas hearings to critique the ways physically abused women are treated and their
stories are heard. Like ProfessorScheppele, ProfessorMahoney examines the hearings and observes
how women's credibilityis measuredby a faulty set of assumptions. The battered woman is held to
account: Why didn't she leave? Why didn't she do something? Or at least say something? The
presumption is that it could not have been that bad because the woman chose to stay in the
relationship. Therefore,the woman's account of the batteryis discounted. See id. at 1285-87.
173. See Scheppele, supra note 168, at 138-45 (describinghow rape survivors alter their stories
over time in orderto deal with this trauma).
174. See David S. Caudill, Freud and CriticalLegal Studies: Contoursof a Radical Socio-Legal
Psychoanalysis, 66 IND.L. J. 651, 658-59 (1991).
175. See id. at 675 (quoting David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: CriticalLegal Studies and
Empiricism,36 STAN.L. REV.575, 607 (1984), who has characterizedall legal thoughtas "a form of
denial, a way to deal with perceived contradictions that are too painful for us to hold in
consciousness"); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH.L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) (discussing denial of domestic violence and defining
denial as "a defense mechanismwell recognized in psychology that protects people from consciously
knowing things they cannot bear to reckonwith at the time");see also ChristineAdams, Mothers Who
Fail to Protect Their Childrenfrom Sexual Abuse: Addressing the Problem of Denial, 12 YALEL. &
POL'Y REV. 519, 521 (1994) ("Denial is a psychological defense mechanism that a person uses to
screen out distressing realities and the painful feelings they cause.") (citing TABER'SCYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL
DICTIONARY
472 (Clayton L. Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989) (furtherdefining denial)).
176. See Caudill, supra note 174, at 661 (statingthatpsychoanalysis"containsthe possibilities for
an approachthat analyzes the mechanisms by which the social world enters into the experience of
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Women's storiesof rape and other sexual violence, battery,and
harassmentpainta terrifyingportraitof women's everydaylives,177and
are often too painful to hear. Rather than believe that women are in
danger, society looks for psychological comfort by engaging in denial.'78 The overwhelming brutality and violence against women invites
society to discredit women who as survivors,litigants, or political activists agitate to have their stories heard.179Society resortsto the more psychologically reassuring conclusion that the victim must be lying, or at
least exaggerating.18"
The process of denial leads to distortion. In order to deny
women's experiences, we as a society reconceptualize and redefine violence against women so that the only "real rapes"'•' are those perpetrated by the relatively unusual scenario of an attacker hiding in the
bushes,182and the only real traumasare those that elicit an immediate or
near-immediate cry.183 By denying the staggering statisticsof violence

each individual, constructingthe human 'subject' and reproducing itself throughthe perpetuationof
AN
particular patterns of ideology") (quoting S. FROSH,THE POLITICSOF PSYCHOANALYSIS:
INTRODUCTION
AND POST-FREUDIAN
THEORY40 (1987)). See generally DANIEL
TO FREUDIAN
VITALLIES,SIMPLE
THEPSYCHOLOGY
TRUTHS:
OFSELF-DECEPTION
175-79 (1985).
GOLEMAN,
177. According to the Surgeon General,violence from men is the single greatest health threat to
American women. See Weisburd& Levin, supra note 162, at 32 (1994). Data show that women are
far more likely to be targets of gender-related violence, sexual abuse, or intimidation. See The
Violence Against WomenAct of 1991, S. REP. No. 102-197, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., at 33-34 (1991)
WOLF HARLOW,U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF
[hereinafter Violence Against Women Act]; CAROLINE
FEMALEVICTIMSOF VIOLENTCRIME1 (1991); Angela Browne & Kirk R. Williams,
JUSTICE,
Gender, Intimacy, and Lethal Violence: Trendsfrom 1976 Through1987, 7 GENDER& SOC'Y 78
(1993). See generally Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim'sStory,2 TEX.J. WOMEN& L. 277 (1993)
(claiming that the legal system will not acknowledge the wide variety of circumstances in which
sexual violations occur); West, supra note 90 (arguingthat women experience suffering that men do
not, and that the legal system trivializes these gender-basedsufferings).
178. See Mahoney, supra note 175, at 3 ("For actors in the courtroom drama, the fiction that
such violence is exceptional allows denial of the ways in which domestic violence has touched their
own lives."); Scheppele, supra note 168, at 142.
179. See Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal
L. REV. 1295, 1311 (1993)
Perspectives of Domestic Violence in Theoryand Practice, 21 HOFSTRA
(skepticism of women's stories "is far easier than acceptanceof the reality that so many men are so
dangerous,and that there is little (or nothing) many women can do on their own to be safe").
180. Cf.FINALREPORT
OFTHEMICHIGAN
SUPREME
COURTTASKFORCEON GENDERISSUES
IN THE COURTS24 (1989) (revealing the belief that women lie or exaggerate about domestic
violence), cited in Hunter,supra note 2, at n.263.
181. See SUSANESTRICH,
REALRAPE1-7 (1987) (describing differential treatment of "real
rape" and "simple rape" and arguing for a new understandingof rape that "recognizes that a
'simple' rape is a real rape").
182. In fact, most women are raped by people they know. See Weisburd & Levin, supra note
162, at 30 (citing studies that concluded that 70-80% of rapes are committed by acquaintances of the
victim).
183. See Stefan, supra note 161, at 1319-20. This culturalexpectationalso explains the tendency
to describe RTS as a psychological adjustmentproblem, rather than as a natural reaction. See also
supra notes 151-153 and accompanyingtext.

208

CALIFORNIA
LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 85:159

againstwomen(whichis alwayseasy to do),"Mand by ignoringthe stories of individualwomen (harder,but possible),society is spared the
pain of empathizing with women and the difficulty of changing behavior and attitudes. Righteous men are spared facing the fact that they
may not be able to protect their wives, sisters, daughters, or friends.
Violent men are spared facing their crimes. Women are spared the realization of their own vulnerabilityto rape and other sexual violence.
Second, in addition to, or perhaps as part of denial, society's response to women survivors of sexual violence is also affected by the
myopia of power. Functionally, society's construction of women's experience serves to reinforce the culture of the dominant group, mirroring the experience and world view of those in power. Indeed, this focus
on the power differential between men and women is the hallmark of
dominance feminism.
The current construct of a "credible woman" subtly reinforces the
currentpower dynamics between the sexes, demanding that female survivors of sexual violence display stress in a socially acceptable fashion
and report the attack (to male authority figures) immediately. Because
it deviates so markedly from women's reported experiences, this construct, as a functional matter,perpetuates suspicion of women, feeds social denial, and allows violence against women to continue.
An analysis from a power perspective helps to explain silence and
delay of victims of rape and other sexual violence.1s5 In addition to the
184.

"A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic." JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR
Weisburd & Levin, supra note
Cf.
162, at 28 (stating that a vast majorityof those who murder women are present or former intimate
partners). As Professor Deborah Rhode acknowledges, rape may be the most underreportedof all
crimes and "[e]stimates of the percentage [of rapes] reaching police attentionrange from 5 to 50
percent, and much appearsto depend on how one surveys possible victims." RHODE, supra note 162,
at 246; see Stefan, supra note 161, at 1281-85 (discussing various methods of measuring rape
including FBI reports,the NationalCrime VictimizationSurvey, and various other surveys). Fear of
rape dramaticallyaffects women's exercise of their personal and civil rights. As the Report of the
Senate JudiciaryCommittee on the Violence Against Women Act recently noted,
[O]ne recent study showed that three-quartersof women never go to the movies alone after
dark because of the fear of rape and nearly 50 percentdo not use public transit alone after
dark for the same reason. Women accommodate their fears by restrictingtheir behavior.
Due in large partto the fear of rape, a woman is eight times more likely than a man to avoid
walking in her own neighborhoodafter dark.
Violence Against WomenAct, supra note 177, at 38-39.
185. This focus on power is also supportedby linguistic and anthropologicalstudies that indicate
gender and class differences in courtroomspeech patterns. These studies document that women and
other subordinatedgroups employ speech patterns and communicationstrategies that are perceived
as less credible. See BarbaraBezdek, Silence in the Court:Participationand Subordinationof Poor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 533, 583 (1992) (citing ROBIN LAKOFF,
LANGUAGE
ANDWOMAN'SPLACE(1975)) (discussing "powerless speech"); John M. Conley et al.,
The Power of Language: PresentationalStyle in the Courtroom,1978 DUKEL. J. 1375, 1380 (defining
a powerless speech style and noting that the style is used more frequently by female witnesses);
Peggy C. Davis, ContextualLegal Criticism:A DemonstrationExploring Hierarchy and "Feminine"
Style,66 N.Y.U. L. REV.1635, 1647-54 (1991) (discussing discoursepatternsassociated with gender,
QUOTATIONS766:11 (15th ed. 1980) (attributedto Joseph Stalin).
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psychic numbnessand self-blamethey experience,"'their delay may
stem in partfrompowerlessness,andin partfroman awarenessthattheir
claims will not be vindicated or respected. The survivor who becomes
numb to her terror for weeks after the rape or other sexual violence,
(much like the wife who remains with her abusive husband"87or the
highly placed assistant who tolerates sexual harassment),'18contrasts
sharply with the image of the powerful excited utterer perpetuated by
evidence law. These women do not cry out quickly in excited proclamations; instead they delay making formal reports or even telling anyone. Given the structureof evidence law, however, this very response of
the less powerful further undermines their claims. Consequently, their
silence and delay discredits them even more. Because of this delay, they
are perceived as brooding, conniving, and untrustworthy,rather than
spontaneous, instinctive, and honest; there is little recognition of their
shame, their fear of making a report,or their need to sort through emotions and options.'89
Thus, the excited utterance makes sense only for those who feel
safe enough to issue a cry of protest, and secure enough that the cry will
be taken seriously.'90One can see this as a conspiracy-it certainly has
effectively squelched women's voices-or one can see it, as this author
does, as part of the hubris of power. Those who possess power may be
oblivious to the nature of that power, understandingtheir elevated status
as the natural order of things. Like Wigmore, they rely on their own
experience-and assume its universality. As beneficiaries in the power
hierarchy, they assume its correctness, fairness, and inevitability. As
winners, they are not promptedto question whether a style of discourse
including signs of uncertainty);Lucie E. White, Mobilizationon the Margins of the Lawsuit:Making
Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV.L. & Soc. CHANGE535, 543 n.35 (1987-88) (citing
Conley et al., supra). Hallmarks of this powerless speech include tentativeness, hedging, hiding
statementswithin questions,and using modifiersthat tend to underminethe content of the statement.
The pattern serves to reinforce the hierarchy of speakers and invites the listener to discount the
speaker's personal communicationand importance. See Bezdek, supra, at 584-85 (citing Lakoff and
studies by William O'Barrin which jurors asked to assess witnesses' testimony after hearing tapes of
identical transcriptsbut in powerful and powerless styles assessed the powerless style speakersas less
credible).
186. See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 153, at 1067 n.24 (discussing parallelsbetween Post-Traumatic
Stress Syndromeand RTS); text accompanyingnotes 151-153.
187. See generally Mahoney,supra note 175.
188. See generally Susan Estrich,Sex at Work,43 STAN.L. REV.813 (1991).
189. Social science research has demonstratedthat women's communicationstyles tend to be
perceived as less credible generally. See Hunter,supra note 2, at 165 (noting that women's speech
patterns,"such as 'ums,' rising intonations,and hesitancy, are associated with powerlessness").
190. See id. at 127 (emphasizingthe themes of admissibilityand credibility and arguing that first
women's stories be allowed into court and that "then [courts] must take these stories seriously").
Hunternotes that "[t]hereare also good reasons why women may fail to report abuse at the time it
occurred: they may feel that complaints are hopeless or may be traumatized or intimidatedinto
silence." Id. at 160.
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that works for them may not be universal. This inability to see other
perspectives (born of the lack of need to do so) is a failure of empathy.'91 It also reinforces denial. Those who cannot speak in the language of power will not be as readily heard; if stories of rape and other
sexual violence are not heard, the problem can easily be denied.
Practically speaking, a powerful person exposed to a great affront
such as sexual harassmentor physical violence would respond decisively
and without delay. Those in positions of power rail at unjust treatment,
in part, because they possess the conviction that they deserve better.
Furthermore,as members of a dominant class, they have a reasonable
expectation that their rights and concerns will be addressed.'92 Their
experience in negotiating the legal system and other social institutions
promotes their confidence that they can redress wrongs perpetrated
against them.
Thus, the excited utterance exception may indeed delineate the
hallmarks of believability in describing the perspective of certain dominant and powerful speakers. Because they are dominant and have control over their lives, such speakers confront few circumstances that
challenge their worldviews; nothing in their lives has prompted them to
notice that their experiences are not universal. But it is these very assumptions of normalcy, objectivity, and universality that feminism
challenges.
E. Extending the Excited UtteranceDoctrine
Two points emerge for future consideration. First, although the
starkest examples of disbelieving women surround rape and other sexual violence, it would be interesting to apply this analysis to other
events. One obvious way to extend this analysis is to apply it to other
areas of law in which women are not believed, and myths of female
wrongdoing are used to blame the victim, such as domestic battery, sex191. Fora wonderfuldefinitionanddiscussionof empathy,see LynneN. Henderson,Legality
and Empathy,85 MICH.
L. REv. 1574, 1579-82(1987) (identifyingthree aspectsof empathyor
empathiccapacity:1) the capacityto perceiveothersas sharingone's own goals, interests,and
feelings;2) the imaginativeexperienceof the situationof another;and 3) the responsethat
another'sdistress,whichmay(butnotmust)leadto actionto easethepain
accompanies
experiencing
of another).
192. Giventhispower-based
it is reasonableto believethatwomenof color,who
explanation,
haveless powerandless claimon therulingelite,maybe doublydisbelieved.Somewomenof color
mayalsobe hampered
by dividedloyaltiesin issuesof genderpoliticsthatseem to pit whitewomen
men. Recentcases involvingallegationsof rape or violence against
againstAfrican-American
famousAfrican-American
men (suchas MikeTysonand O.J.Simpson)have pittedallegianceto
race against allegiance to sisterhood. See RobertGarcia,Rape, Lies and Videotape, 25 Loy. L.A. L
REV. 711, 721 n.38 (1992) (citing Harris, supra note 93, at 598-601 (1990)) (discussing black
women's conflict between victimization by rape and empathy for black men who have been
victimized by society); Valerie Smith, SplitAffinities:The Case of Interracial Rape, in CONFLICTS
IN
FEMINISM
271, 278-84 (MarianneHirsh & Evelyn Keller Fox eds., 1990).
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ual harassment,and stalking. Indeed, one could postulate that the critique could apply to all utterancesmade by women concerning startling
events. If the willingness to make a quick, excited declaration reflects a
typically male conversationalstyle, the excited utterance rule would fail
to describe the experiences of female witnesses in all types of exciting
events.
The problem with this extension of the doctrine, however, is that the
delay and hesitation produced by some startling events might be less
pronounced than in cases of sexually related crimes, where a woman
feels her general powerlessness mixed with the shame associated with
sexual assault or harassment. Arguably, a woman might fit more closely
into the "reliable" observer mold delineated by the excited utterance
exception if she is involved in a traffic accident than if she survives sexual violence. As a witness to a traffic accident, her status is less subordinate, her person is not violated, and the woman may feel powerful
enough to speak in the voice of the empowered. In addition, society's
psychological need to deny her story is diminished in the case of a traffic accident, as comparedwith a tale of sexual violence.
A second point for further thought involves extending the analysis
to other groups. If, indeed, the excited utterance exception provides an
example where the dominant culture misunderstandsor ignores the less
powerful, this feminist critique of the excited utterance exception could
logically extend to other oppressed groups, such as racial minorities,
homosexuals, or the poor, whose history of subjugation and cultivation
of different voices may influence their ability to fit into the evidentiary
mold of the credible speaker.193 Suspicion of delay is not exclusively a
problem for women, but may in fact affect anyone who is made to feel
less powerful through the trauma of violence or unpleasant and unbidden sexual or physical attention. Hence, this part of the critique could
apply to some male victims of violence or harassment,or any group that
has less access to and confidence in the justice system.
Whateverthis feminist critique may teach us about communication
in general, and however it may extend to other groups and other exciting events, it is clear that evidence law must be modified to address the
disparity between RTS and the currentstructureof the excited utterance
exception. The excited utteranceexception disserves the practical needs
of women by relying on an underinclusive, arguably patriarchalview of
how people react to the stress of rape or other sexual violence.'94 We
193. This hypothesis is supported by the research on powerful and powerless speech. See
White, supra note 185, at 542-44 (discussing the power and perceived credibility of the poor);
Bezdek, supra note 185 (same).
194. Others have criticized the exception as over-inclusive in that it admits statementsthat are
not necessarily accurate or reliable, see Swift, supra note 130, at 1347-54, but that issue does not
arise here, except insofar as it adds irony to the exclusion of women's voices.
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cannot continue to rely on unsound cultural intuitions that reflect
gendered notions of normalcy and credibility. If the purpose of the
excited utterance rule is, in fact, to assure credibility, it is essential that
the law reflect what psychology has told us about the experience of
women. We must listen to the observations of psychologists and the
self-reporting of women regardinghow survivors of sexual attacks actually respond. Furthermore,this call for change does not imply that psychology or even feminism is fully free of cultural bias and sexism.
What follows is a proposal that attempts to confront some of the entrenched distrust of women that underlies the evidence rules, and to address problems with the current doctrine, reflecting current knowledge
about the psychology of survivors of rape and other sexual violence.
V
A PROPOSALFOR AMENDING THE EXCITED UTTERANCE RULE
AND FOR ESTABLISHINGA NEW HEARSAY EXCEPTION FOR
SURVIVORS OF RAPE AND OTHER SEXUAL VIOLENCE

This Article proposes a change in the current excited utterance
rule'95and outlines a related new hearsay exception for survivors of
violent or sexual crimes. The proposed new exception reflects the insight that because sexual violence derives from power plays by the perpetratorand often induces shame on the part of the victim, it is unlikely
that many survivors,especially women (but not exclusively so), will report immediately. The admission of such survivors' hearsay statements
about the rape or other sexual violence, regardless of the timing of the
report, would render evidence law more inclusive and psychologically
informed.
As a doctrinal matter, the proposed changes straddle the division
between Rule 803 hearsay exceptions, for which the declarant's availability is immaterial, and Rule 804 hearsay exceptions, for which the
declarant must be shown to be unavailable. The revised excited utterance rule would create a preferencefor the victim's availability in court,
but would also admit victims' hearsay statementswhere the victim was
proven to be unavailable.'96The proposed rule reads as follows:

195. Becausetheexcitedutterance
draftedprobablydoes serve some
exceptionas it is currently
I amloatheto abandonit entirely. The feministcritique,
speakersandhassurvivedforgenerations,
like thepsychologicalone,stemsfromconcernsthatthe doctrineis flawedand underrepresentative,
notthatit is entirelywithoutvalue. Instead,my proposalretainsthe doctrinewithmodifications
that
acutallyincreaseits fairnessto the accused.
196.

Cf. Michael L. Seigel, RationalizingHearsay: A Proposalfor a Best EvidenceHearsay Rule,

72 B.U. L. REV.893, 897, 928-38 (1992) (stressingthe importanceof makingavailabledeclarants
and proposinga hearsay rule that would take into acount the
subject to cross-examination
available).
prosecutor'sabilityto makedeclarants
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The following statementsare not excluded by the hearsay rule if
the declarant is available for cross-examination concerning the
statement or if the declarant is proven to be unavailable under
Rule 804(a):
a) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
b) Sexual violence survivor's statement. A statement concerning
a sexual assault, made by the survivorconcerning the event or its
effect on the survivor. Where the survivor is unavailable pursuant to Rule 804(a), the survivor's statement is admissible only if
the court finds that circumstances surrounding its making indicate the trustworthinessof the statement. For the purposes of
this exception, survivor shall mean an adult who has experienced
sexual assault as defined by Federal law or law of a State (as defined in section 513 of title 18, United States Code) that involved(1) any conduct proscribed by chapter 109A of title 18,
United States Code;
(2) contact, without consent, between any part of the defendant's body or an object and the genitals or anus of another
person;
(3) contact, without consent, between the genitals or anus of
the defendant and any other person's body;
(4) deriving sexual pleasure or gratificationfrom the infliction
of death, bodily injury, or physical pain on another person; or
(5) an attempt or conspiracy to engage in conduct described
in paragraphs(1)-(4).
The victim need not actually be alive or available to qualify
as a survivor.
c) Notice to the accused in a criminal case. In a criminal case,
the prosecutormust give reasonablewritten notice in advance of
the trial or hearing, or during trial if the court excuses pre-trial
notice on good cause shown, of the intention to introduce an excited utteranceor a survivor's statement.
A. Doctrinal Changes
The proposal under subsection (a) differs from the current excited
utterancein two major respects: availability of the declarant and notice
to the defendant. Currently,the excited utteranceexception, as codified
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, applies whether or not the declarant is available to testify. Astoundingly, this means that under the current rule the declarantcould be sitting in the courtroomand the hearsay
could nevertheless be used in preference to in-court testimony without
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any opportunity for the accused to confront the declarant.'7 The proposed revision to the excited utterancerule allows the opposing party to
confront and cross-examine the declarant concerning the statement
whenever the declarantis in fact available. In most cases covered by this
proposed amendment to the excited utterance, the survivor will testify
and the criminal defendant will have an opportunity to cross-examine
the survivorand the testifying witnesses, and will suffer no unfairness.'98
Furthermore,the criminal defendant will receive notice from the prosecutor pursuantto section (c). From the perspective of a criminal defendant, this is an improvementover the existing excited utterancerule.
To offer an excited utterance where the declarant does not testify,
the prosecution must show that the declarant is unavailable. The standard for unavailabilityis set out in FederalRule of Evidence 804(a) and
includes incompetency and incapacity.'" The most frequent causes of
declarant's unavailability involve subsequent interference with her ability to testify (such as sickness, intimidation,or death), or, in the case of a
very young child, incompetence to testify. Although there is a strong
argument that emotional incapacity to face the perpetratorshould constitute unavailability for traumatized adults as well as children, that
question is best left for another day. If evidence law were to allow an
adult's unavailability to derive from emotional trauma, the declarant's
statement would obviously be admissible only upon a particularized
showing that such testimony would create trauma for the declarant
197. This is reminiscentof Sir Walter Raleigh's objectionthat his accuser (whose testimony was
summarizedthroughaffidavit) was "hardby" and should have been made available for questioning.
1 Knight's Crim. Trials 418 (1932), cited in JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
83-84 (7th ed. 1992).
EVIDENCE
198. Although this is not exactly equivalentto confrontingthe declarantat the time she makes the
statement,it is very close, and the SupremeCourthas approvedsuch subsequentconfrontationwhere
the witness takes the stand. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 159 (1970) (stating that "the
inability to cross-examinethe witness at the time he made his prior statement cannot easily be shown
to be of crucial significance as long as the defendant is assured of full and effective crossexaminationat the time of trial").
199. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) provides:
Definition of unavailability. "Unavailabilityas a witness" includes situationsin which the
declarant(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the groundof privilege from testifying concerning
the subject matterof the declarant'sstatement;or
(2) persists in refusingto testify concerningthe subject matter of the declarant's statement
despite an orderof the courtto do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matterof the declarant'sstatement;or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing
physical or mentalillness or infirmity;or
(5) is absent from the hearingand the proponentof a statementhas been unable to procure
the declarant's attendance(or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision(b)(2),
(3), or (4), the declarant'sattendanceor testimony) by process or other reasonablemeans.
A declarantis not unavailableas a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory,
inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a
statementfor the purposeof preventingthe witness from attendingor testifying.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
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above and beyond the expected distress of testifying about painful, personal events.20
The proposed requirementthat the declarantbe proven unavailable
or remain available for cross-examination represents a doctrinal departure. Since its inception, the excited utteranceexception has not considered the declarant's availability. The theory behind this notion that the
excited declarant's availability is immaterial stems from the belief that
the declarant can offer no additional insight that would be more valuable to the factfinder than the excited, on-the-spot declaration. By the
time of trial, he would be calm, and the testimony of an unexcited live
witness is deemed less accurate than the out-of-court excited utterance
by the same individual.
This approach, however, not only calls into question the entire
premise of the hearsay rule, but it ignores entirely the value of crossexamination. Despite the inability to replicate the on-the-spot excitement (assuming for the sake of argument that the excitement does indeed enhance trustworthiness),cross-examination would be useful to
examine importantunderlying facts. Cross-examination would explore
the declarant's excited state, vantage point, ability to perceive events, or
possible bias.20' Thus, this proposal, which expresses a preference for
cross-examinationwhere possible, responds to longstanding criticism of
the excited utterance doctrine and injects some good sense and fairness
into the rule.202As a practicalmatter,the proposal will probablynot create a substantialchange from current custom. Good trial tactics often
dictate a preference for live testimony to buttress out-of-court statements, most available adult declarantsdo testify.
B. The Survivor's Statement
Section (b) of the proposed hearsay exception, by far the greater
innovation, applies specifically to survivors of rape and other sexual
crimes. Most notably, it eliminates all timing requirements. Any statement, no matter how long after the incident, qualifies as a survivor's
statementunder the proposal if it is made by the survivor and relates to
rape or other sexual violence. Such survivor's statementsare admissible
200. Cf Maryland
v. Craig,497 U.S. 836 (1990) (allowingchildrento testifyby closed-circuit
televisionratherthanpersonallyconfrontthe defendantif particularized
showingis madethat the
child-witnesswouldexperiencetraumafromface-to-faceconfrontation
withaccused).
201. Thesefoundationfacts enablethe trierof fact to evaluatea declarant'sreliability.See
Swift, supra note 130, at 1356-61.

202. In fact,thisformulation
reflectsthe requestof the petitionerin Whitev. Illinois,502 U.S.
346 (1992),whoarguedthat"theConfrontation
Clauseof the SixthAmendment
requiresthat... the
at trialorthetrialcourtmustfindthatthe declarantis
prosecutionmusteitherproducethe declarant
unavailable."Id. at 348-49;see also Seigel, supranote 196 (emphasizingthe importanceof
subjectingavailablewitnessesto cross-examination).
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for the truthof the mattersasserted.2t"
Theymay be offered by the declarantor by otherssuch as rapecounselorsandfriends,who will testify
as to what the survivorsaid concerningthe rape or other sexual violence. This new exception eliminates the doctrinal confusion and inconsistency surrounding length of delay under the current excited
utterance rule.
More importantly, it remedies a fundamental, substantive flaw in
the excited utterancedoctrine. The idea of an excited utterance fails to
portray accurately a response to stress that is common to survivors of
sexual violence. The proposal addresses this problem by admitting survivors' utterances even when they were made significantly after the
traumaticevent. This recognition that many such survivors delay in reporting the traumaticevent comports with not only RTS, but also with
the more general (and gender-neutral) tenets of Post-Traumatic Stress
Syndrome, upon which RTS is based.
Additionally, the proposed rule does not require that the survivor's
state of nervous excitement or shock be proved by independent evidence.204Rape and other sexual violence is stressful enough to qualify
without any outward manifestation of nervousness (which according to
RTS may be lacking). By focusing on sexual violence, the proposal
addresses another doctrinal problem, by reducing the need for judicial
determinationof whether an event qualifies as "exciting." The exception as proposed could also apply to civil cases (such as where a woman
who was raped sues her attackerin tort) but was designed primarily with
criminal cases in mind.
The survivor's exception could be adopted without undue hardship
on criminal defendants;it nevertheless presents tricky Sixth Amendment
issues. Like the proposed revised excited utterance rule, the exception
203.
The newly proposedRule does not limit the use of the survivor's out-of-court statement to
rehabilitation. Rehabilitation,a traditional vehicle for admitting a rape survivor's out-of-court
statements, allows prosecutors to use rape survivors' out-of-court statements to rehabilitate their
credibility only if the honesty or veracity of the rape survivor is challenged by the defendant,
something smartdefendantsavoid doing. See FED.R. EVID.801(d)(1)(B) (limitingadmission of prior
consistent statements by witnesses "to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive"). See generally Christine Kenmore, The
Admissibilityof ExtrajudicialRape Complaints,64 B.U. L. REV.199, 211-15 (1984).
204. Obviously, the trialjudge must make a preliminarydeterminationthat a triggeringviolent or
sexual event occurred. See FED. R. EVID. 104. The judge need not, however, seek evidence
independentof the survivor's statement to make that determination. See Bourjailyv. United States,
483 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987) (noting that "no independentinquiryinto reliability is required when the
evidence 'falls within a firmly rooted hearsayexception"') (quoting Ohio v. Roberts,448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980)). Nonetheless, one of the ways that rape victims were traditionallyexcluded from the excited
utterance exception was this requirement of independent evidence of excitement. Wigmore in
particularcautioned that rape itself should not be used as evidence of excitement, and independent
evidence of stress must be brought in order for a woman's statement to qualify as an excited
utterance. See 6 WIGMORE,
supra note 11, ? 1753.
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requires the declarant either to testify or to be proven unavailable.
Where the declarant-survivortestifies, no objection concerning the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontationarises. Furthermore,
the notice requirementprotects against any last-minute surprises for the
accused.205 Where the declarant is unavailable, however, a Sixth
Amendment confrontation problem arises, because by definition this
new proposal is not "firmly rooted." This triggers a need for the Court
to seek "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness"206 to satisfy the
Sixth Amendment standard. The trustworthinessrequirement in the
proposal reflects that constitutional concern.
The trustworthinessrequirement also, unfortunately, echoes some
retrograde "corroboration"requirements,inviting the accused to attack
the survivor's credibility and the judge to weigh the survivor's believability. One can imagine a situation where an unenlightened judge applies the very suspect considerationsthe proposal was meant to counter:
concerns about delay, suspicions about calm demeanor, and general
mistrust of women. The trustworthinessfinding is necessary, however,
given the current state of Sixth Amendmentjurisprudence.207Therefore,
educating judges about the reasons for a survivor's statement-i.e., that
survivors of rape and other sexual violence do not necessarily behave
according to the cultural model of the credible witness-becomes a crucial task. Judges must be educated about RTS, but not use it as an absolute measure of credibility. Rather,they need to be educated about
the effects of traumaticstress and RTS and the potential for gender bias
in fact-finding generally.
This proposal focuses on rape and other sexual violence because
most of this Article's discussion of the difference and dominance voices
relies on legal and psychological scholarshipconcerning rape. The Article has relied extensively on RTS for the proposition that the voices
and style of communication of women who have experienced sexual
violence differ from social expectations. Another benefit of focusing
on sexual violence is that there is already a trend in evidence law treating rape and other sexual violence differently from other crimes. One
example is the rape shield law; another much more controversial example is the new Federal Rule of Evidence 413, which routinely admits
evidence of the accused's similar prior acts in rape cases.208 Further205. This notice requirement mirrors the recent amendment to Rule 404(b) and the notice
requirementin the residual hearsayexception 803(24). See FED. R. EVID.404(b), 803(24).
206. Idahov. Wright,497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990) (citing Roberts,448 U.S. at 65).
207. Thanks to MyrnaRaeder for pointing this out. See Raeder, supra note 165 (delineating a
Domestic Homicide HearsayException and requiringthat "the circumstancessurroundingits making
indicate the trustworthinessof the statement").
208. See Aviva Orenstein, A Feminist Critique of Character Evidence and New Rule 413
(unpublishedmanuscript,on file with CaliforniaLaw Review).
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more,in the traditionof the evidencerules,the proposalis gender neutral. RapeTraumaSyndromeis based on Post-TraumaticStressSyndromegenerally,andthereis reasonto believe thatmen experiencerape
and othersexual violence as traumaticand may, becauseof shame,exhibit many of the less powerful speaking styles associated with
women.209
It is fruitfulto thinkabouthow the proposalmight be expandedto
includeothertypes of intrusiveand domineeringbehavior. The extension could includestalking,sexualharassment,
and other wrongfulconductthatinducefear,shame,or post-traumatic
stress. More researchon
the effects of thesebehaviorsandsomeexperiencewiththe ruleas more
narrowlyproposedwill informany futureattemptsto expandthe survivor's exception.
A concern raisedby any new exceptionto the hearsayrule is the
effect that it will have on the conductof a trial. One function of the
hearsayruleis to diminishthe amountof evidencepresentedand make
trialsmanageable. Whatwill happento the length and confusion of a
trialif every out-of-courtstatementmadeby a rapeor other sexual violence survivorcomes in? The solution to this administrative
problem
lies in Rule403, whichallows a trialjudge to exclude evidencebecause
of "waste of time" or "needless presentationof cumulative evidence."210 Statementsby the rape or other sexual violence survivor that

are merely cumulativeare probably excludable under Rule 403, al-

209. Theeffectsof sexualassaulton malesurvivorsare traumatic,and maybe quitesimilarto
women'sdocumentedreactionsto sexualassualt,includingshameanddenial. See StuartTurner,
C. MEZEYAND MICHAEL
B. KING,MALE
SurvivingSexual Assault and Sexual Torture,in GILLIAN
75 (1992) (arguingthat men are likely to engage in the avoidance and
VICTIMSOF SEXUALASSAULT

denialbehaviorassociatedwithpost-traumatic
stressdisorderbecauseof theirfailureto repel their
and AIDSis too shamefulto
attackers,andbecausetheassociationof malerapewithhomosexualtiy
reveal);GillianC. Mezey,Treatment
of MaleVictimsof Rape,in id. at 131(arguingthatthereis little
evidencesuggestingthatmenand womenreact to sexualassaultdifferently,althoughsome studies
haveshownthatwomenare moreanxiousandwillingto receive help,andmen are morelikelyto
externalizetheirangerandbehavebelligerently
in thelongterm);ArthurKaufman,
et al., MaleRape
Victims:NoninstitutionalizedAssault, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
221 (1980) (comparing14 male victims

with 100femalerapevictimsandfindingthatthe menwere morephysicallytraumatized
and were
morelikelyto engagein denialto controltheiremotions,andless likelyto revealtheirassaultsthan
thewomenstudied).
210. FederalRuleof Evidence403 provides:
Althoughrelevant,evidence may be excluded if its probativevalue is substantially
outweighedby the dangerof unfairprejudice,confusionof the issues,or misleadingthe
of unduedelay, waste of time, or needlesspresentationof
jury, or by considerations
cumulativeevidence.
FED.R. EvID.403. TheadvisorycommitteenoteexplainsthatRule403 covers
riskswhichrangeall the way frominducingdecisionon a purelyemotionalbasis,at one
extreme,to nothingmoreharmfulthanmerelywastingtime,at theotherextreme.Situations
in this areacall forbalancingthe probativevalueof and need for the evidenceagainstthe
harmlikelyto resultfromits admission.
FED. R. EVID.403 advisory committee's note.
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thoughthe possibilitythata survivor'sadditionaldeclarationswouldnot
affect credibilityseems unlikelyunless they were truly numerousand
entirelyredundant.21'Alternatively,a judge might exclude a survivor's
statementif there is reasonableconcern that the jury would confuse
variousout-of-courtstatementswithlive testimonyor other admissible
statements.This too seemsunlikely,giventhe fact thatthe survivorwill
be availableto takethe standand the jury will readilybe able to distinguish what the survivorcurrentlytestifiesto and former out-of-court
The potentialfor unfair prejudiceseems greatestwhere
statements.212
is
the declarant unavailable.The addedtrustworthiness
requirementaddressesthis concern.
Finally,it is importantto note thattheseproposedreformsare more
thanjust a revivalof the promptcomplaintdoctrineadornedin feminist
garb.213The proposedsurvivor'sstatementexceptiondiffers from the
promptcomplaintin four significantways. Firstand most obviously,it
211. Commentatorswarn against over-extension of the "waste of time" prong, which is "a
concession to the shortnessof life," according to Justice Holmes in Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938,
944 (Mass. 1887); see MUELLER& KIRKPATRICK,
supra note 24; WRIGHT& GRAHAM,supra note 49,

? 5211.
212. Some courts, in debating whether to admit the substance of a rape survivor's prompt
complaint, have expressed concern that "repeated iteration" of the survivor's complaint might
artificially magnify the evidence and bolster the survivor's testimony unfairly. See State v. Troupe,
677 A.2d 917, 928 (Conn. 1996). The fear is that in reaffirming the admissibility of prompt
complaints for the substanceas well as the fact of the complaint,the repetitive testimonyof various
witnesses about the complaints would "lend undue credibility" to the survivor's testimony.
Commonwealthv. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672, 675 (Mass. 1992). Obviously, this Article asserts that,
given the suspicion against women and the denial of rape, there is little chance that evidence of a
survivor's statement will overwhelm the jury. Furthermore,any danger of unfair prejudice or
confusion could be handledbest by Rule 403. Therefore, admittingthe substance of the surivivor's
statementis the betterresult.
213. In fact, many courts have struggledwith the promptcomplaintdoctrine,recognizing that the
notion that a woman will immediatelycomplainis antiquated,sexist, and empiricallywrong. See, e.g.,
People v. Brown, 883 P.2d. 949, 956 (Cal. 1994) ("The overwhelming body of current empirical
studies, data, and other informationestablishes that it is not inherently 'natural' for the victim to
confide in someone or to disclose, immediately following commision of the offense, that he or she
was sexually assulated."); Licata, 591 N.E.2d at 674 ("We strongly disagree with the notion that a
rape victim naturallywill complainof an attack soon after it occurs."); State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370,
377 (N.J. 1990) (describingthe promptcomplaint rule as a necessary evil that "serves to neutralize
the sexist expectations of some jurors that the woman should have complained after having been
raped").
Ultimately, the benefits of admittingprompt complaints trump some courts' unwillingness to
endorse the stereotypes underlyingthe promptcomplaintdoctrine. In Troupe, for example, the court
criticized the promptcomplaintdoctrinefor its assumptionthat "any 'normal' woman would report a
rape soon after its occurrence." 677 A.2d at 924 (quoting State v. Kendricks, 891 S.W.2d 597, 601
(Tenn. 1994)). It nonetheless opined that the presumptionsunderlyingthe promptcomplaint doctrine
still hold sway with jurors,as failureto reportstill "casts doubt on the credibility of the accusation."
Id. at 927. Troupealso illustratesthe need for a survivor's exception to the excited utterance rule.
After an angst-riddendiscussion in that case, the SupremeCourtof Connecticutscaled-backits policy
of allowing substantiveuse of a prior statement by a rape survivor and reverted to a rule allowing
only testimony as to the fact of the complaint. Id. at 923-28.
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eliminates the "promptness" requirement. Learning from RTS that
delay in reportingrape and other sexual violence is a normal reaction, it
does not require an immediate, first opportunity,or even prompt report.
Second, the substance of the survivor's statement is admissible for its
truth, unlike a prompt complaint, which is only admissible for the fact
that a complaint was made.2"4Third, the proposed survivor's exception
is born out of feminist concern for how women are treated in the courtroom, unlike the prompt complaint requirement, which is rooted in
mistrust of women. Rather than perpetuate the notion of an immediate
cry (with the ironic twist that the rule of prompt complaint is often perceived to provide a special advantage for women), the proposed survivor's exception actually reflects what we know about how people react
to the traumaof sexual attack. Finally, the proposal extends its reach in
a gender-neutral fashion, including all who have suffered a violent or
sexual crime.
C. The Practical Effect of the Survivor'sStatement
From a feminist perspective, the greatest concern must surroundthe
proposal's practical effect on the lives of women who report crimes of
sex and violence. The history of feminist jurisprudence demonstrates
that well-intentioned reforms, born of feminist theory, can sometimes
make women's lives harder.215At first blush one might wonder whether
the new proposal, which requires available declarants to be subject to
cross-examination, might not impose additional hardship, as compared
to the currentexcited utterance, which holds the declarant's availability
immaterial.
First, because many survivor statementsdo not fit the current excited utteranceexception, many women have lost nothing. Furthermore,
as a practicalmatter,it is hardto imagine a prosecution for rape or any
other violent or sexual crime where a survivor,available to testify, would
not be called. Certainly the case law involving excited utterances made
by survivors of rape and other sexual violence indicates that survivors'
extra-judicial statements are generally introduced to supplement the
survivors' in-court testimony, not to replace it.216 Finally, and most
214. See Statev. Grady183N.W.2d707, 715-18 (Iowa 1971)(distinguishing
promptcomplaint
fromexcitedutterance);
Statev. Bray,594 P.2d1363,1367(Wash.Ct.App.1979)(same).
215.

See, e.g., MARTHAALBERTSON
OF EQUALITY:
THE RHETORIC
FINEMAN,THEILLUSION

ANDREALITY
OFDIVORCE
REFORM
17-75(1991) (discussingthe negativeeffects that notionsof
andequalityhavehadon women'sproperty
in divorces,such as under
distributions
genderneutrality
no-faultschemes).
216. My reviewof the casesindicatesthatwhereavailable,the declarantrapesurvivorusually
testifies.See,e.g., UnitedStatesv. Dia,No. 93-10592(9thCir.1994)(mem.op.)(citingthe "victim's
highlycredibletestimony"and allowingstatementsmade to her roommateunder the excited
utteranceexception);Hackerv. Armontrout,
No. 90-0246-CV-W-3,1990U.S. Dist.LEXIS17454
(1990)(habeaspetitionchallengingadmissionof survivor'stestimonyregardingstatementsshe made
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problematicfrom a confrontationperspective,the proposalallows for
the possibilitythatbecauseof injury,intimidation,or emotionaltrauma
the survivorwill be deemedunavailableto testify. If such unavailability
is proved, the survivor's statement may be admitted as substantive evidence even though the declarantwill not be cross examined concerning
the statement.
A concern exists about how these proposals will affect young children who are victims of sexual assault and for whom the excited utterance has up until now served as a flexible means of admitting extrajudicial statementsto parents,counselors, and doctors. Indeed, the most
frequent scenario where the survivor does not testify involves a childvictim. The pattern involves very young children who are deemed by
virtue of their age, emotional state, or communicationskills to be unable
to testify, but whose statementsto parentsor other supervisoryadults are
crucial to the case. The proposed survivor's exception would probably
serve children well, particularly those deemed unavailable to testify.
Children certainly do not seem to fit the pattern of the excited cry, particularly when they know the abuser. They may not fully comprehend
the inappropriateness of sexual contact, or may fear reprisal.217 The
need for hearsay in cases involving children who survive abuse is often
duringthe rape);Harmonv. Anderson,495 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (rape victim's testimony
supplemented by evidence of excited statementshe made to parties from whom she sought help
immediately after the rape). It is not always clear from an opinion whether the declarant of an
excited utterancewas subject to cross examination at trial. Where the record is clear that an adult
rape survivordid not testify, the main reason for failure of the survivor to testify is that she did not
survive. See, e.g., United States v. Hartmann,958 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1992); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d
390, 392 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valentzas, 1993 WL 37339 (E.D.N.Y., Feb. 5, 1993); Sklar
v. Ryan, 752 F. Supp. 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
Sometimes problemsarise with the in-courttestimony. See, e.g., Stephensv. California, No. C92-20204 RMW, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10727 (victim testified to memory loss because of alcohol
induced blackoutand statedthat she did not want to testify against a family member). Occasionally,
the testimony is vital because the witness, thoughphysically available,will not be of much use to the
prosecution. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mass, No. 94-35220, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 25499 (9th Cir. 1994)
(mem. op.) (allowing excited utterance of rape victim reported by witnesses where victim was
incarceratedin mental hospital for severe psychosis at time of trial); People v. Soto, 35 Cal. Rptr.2d
846 (1994) (admittingexcited utteranceto daughterand neighborswhere victim, an elderly woman,
suffered totally debilitatingstroke after attemptedrape). Occasionally, a rape survivor's excited
utteranceis used when the woman recantsher testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Haner, FR07448-8033, 1996 WL 520968 (A.F.Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 8. 1996) (conviction upheld where wife's
excited utteranceadmittedto prove rape despite her testimony that husbandengaged in consensual
sadomasochistic sex).
By contrast,in cases involving children,the main reason for lack of cross examination was the
children's incompetence. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (four-year-old who was
sexually assaulted and experienced emotional difficulty left court without testifying); Byrd v.
Blodgett, 985 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1993) (unpublishedtable decision); Gregory v. State, 900 F.2d 705,
705 n.l (4th Cir. 1990) (trial court found child "could not intelligibly express what had happened").
217. See CynthiaJ. Hennings,AccommodatingChildAbuse Victims:Special Hearsay Exceptions
in Sexual Offense Prosecutions, 16 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 663, 670-71 (1989) (discussing the need to
protect victims of child abuse from courtroomtrauma).
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acute because the child is so frightened and reluctant to testify that incourt testimony seems false or coached, whereas the out-of-court, matter-of-fact statement by the child has the ring of truth.218
This proposal would also address much of the criticism that courts
extend the excited utterance exception inappropriately, stretching the
doctrine beyond recognition in cases involving child victims. Children
raise many special issues,219and this Article will forgo the "lifeboat syndrome" of lumping women and children together. It is undeniable that
children receive special treatment,and most would agree that they deserve it, but more study of children's reaction to violence, particularly
sexualized violence, is necessary to draw any firm conclusions on the
point.
CONCLUSION

The feminist critique presented here, an amalgam of difference and
dominance feminism, argues that the current excited utterance doctrine
is underinclusive and relies on narrow and unconsciously gendered notions of how normal, honest people react to stress. In particular,the excited utterance exception subtly undermines women's credibility by
endorsing social expectations and perpetuatinglegal and cultural norms
that conflict with the experiences of survivorsof sexual violence. Furthermore, the excited utterance's construct of how trustworthypeople
behave under stress perpetuates stereotypes that allow society to discredit women and to deny the pervasiveness of rape and other sexual
violence in our society.
This Article proposes a new survivor's exception tailored to victims
of rape and other sexual violence that reflects the experiences of sexual
violence survivors and applies to survivorsof rape and other sexual violence without regard to gender. It attempts to respond to the feminist
challenge without compromising the rights of criminal defendants, and
therefore proposes the increased safeguards of notice, a preference for
in-court testimony to maintain the rights of the accused, and, where the
survivor is unavailable, a requirement that the circumstances surround218. CompareJacksonv. State, 720 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Ark. 1986) (the in-court "testimonyof the
victim and her little brotherwas interspersedwith agonizing pauses. It may be the most extreme case
of witness reluctance and leading we have seen."), with State v. Johnson, 639 P.2d 1332, 1333
(Wash. 1982) (describing an out-of-courtcasual conversationwhere a young girl asked her father if

milkcomesoutof a penis. Shetestifiedattrial"thatdefendant
toldherit was 'milk'that'cameoutof
the penis,' but she didn't think so 'cause it tasted yucky'") overruled on other grounds by State v.

Calle,888 P.2d 155(Wash.1995)(en banc).
219. Courts have acknowledged the special issues children raise both in their very flexible
applications of excited utterance and in their adoption of special rules for testimony and children's
hearsay. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanyingtext (explaining how court can deem sympathetic
children "excited" for weeks to satisfy the doctrinalrequirementsof the excited utterance).
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ing the out-of-court statement provide a particularized guarantee of
trustworthiness.
The analysis invites furtherexploration of how other disempowered
groups (particularlychildren, the poor, and minority group members of
both sexes) react to stress and how, in turn, society perceives their credibility. Additionally, it raises the question of whether the proposed survivor's exception should be expanded to include other crimes besides
sexual violence, such as domestic violence, sexual harassment, and
stalking.220 Finally, this piece invites further feminist analysis of evidence generally, including how the hearsay rule reinforces gender, race,
or class discrimination. The assessment of the hearsay rules as rigid,
acontextual, and hierarchical must be balanced against the rights of
criminal defendants and the practicalities of trial procedure. Achieving
an appropriatebalance between recognizing the experience of survivors
and the rights of criminal defendants, and translatingthat balance into
workable doctrine, present exciting challenges for future scholarship.

220. See Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered WomenSyndromeEvidence in the Prosecution of A
Batterer, 76 IOWAL. REv. 553 (1991) (arguing that battered women display many of the same
behaviors as rape victims). See generally Mahoney, supra note 175 (discussing the myths and
cultural stereotypes surroundingbatteredwomen).

